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I N T ROD U C T ION.
The central .i~ of this the.i. is to .~alu&t. criteria on
which the Full Bench of the Commonwe.lth Concili.tioD end
"."- 0"","
Arbitration Commi.sion may D05sibly baee their decisions OD
whether incre'.8a in the minimua permiS8ibie vag_ payable to
male adult workers in Australi. ia below, the •••••S, or
above incr••••• in the consumer price index, over the period
1956 to 1976. The emphasis is on atte.pting to determine
whether the status of minimum vage iucre'.8. in relation to
con~um.r price index iocrease. h•• b.en consistently dependent
OD one or more economic type rectors throughout this period.
The three ways in which the det. i. exa.ined ~. firstly. with
date relevant to all minimum wage iucre••c. in the period 1956
to Dece~ber 1976 iocluded; secondly, with the d~ta for the
quarterly we~e indexation dacisions of 1975 _ 1976 reaoved and
thirdly with the data pertinent to the 1975 and 1976 ainiaua
~ r._
w~ge increaaes considared aepar~t.ly. Th. .aipnlation of dete
concernin~ the ~lni=um wage increaees awarded under the index_
ation gUidelines~as considered necessary because the .ini~
waze incre~aea granted under the wage indexation guidelinea~
diCter from the oini=um wage increases otherwise granted in e
number of reapeata. Firstly, under the wage indexation guide-
lines, oinimum wage increasee have been granted et roughly three
monthly intervale, in contraet to those granted prior to 1975,
moat or which were granted at intervale of ap~roximate11 one
year, with a gap or three years occurring in one instance, bet-
ween 1961 ~nd 1964. Secondly, the =inimum waga increasea granted
under the wage indexa~1dellnes constitute a group ot mini-
mum w~~e increeaea purport.d~y~grant.dunder st.ted gui~aea,
which ia not the ease with any pazticular group of ainimua wege
1975. It 18 of iatereat to deteraineincrfl6aee granted prior to
w .........
"'tt. the llIiniao.-. wege increases &ranted lUld.er the wage inde:utioD.
guidelinea markedly effect the obserYationa of the per10t 1956 -
1976 •• a whole end vhether the criteria applicable to tha -.se
indexation period differ from those, if aDy, which m.y ~.T. been
conaistently applied by the Full Bench OYer the period May 1956
to Deceober 1976.
The reseerch di~cussed in thie theai. differs from other
.....-..i.~
current end previous work in sevaral aspecta. The research~out_
lined in this thesis is the only one yet undertaken in the
Auetreli"n contextf using the difference between the lursinal
percent~~e v~ri~tion in the minimum wage end the mergin~l per-
cente,e incre~se in the Conaumer Price Index, •• the dependent
v~ri~ble,in ~ study involving Pearson, partiel end multiple
correletion analysi., over the period Hay 1956 to December 1976.
,
,
The rese~rch embodied in this the.ie is elao the firat in
the ~u.tr~lian context, to aeek poesible underlying lectore
influencing the diflerential between ~~rBin.l percenteg.
verietion in the minimum "age end merginal percentege Terie_ I
tiona in tbe Consu.er Price Index over tb. period 1956 to
1976 incluaive.
H03t literature and rea•• rcb d••le with aini.ua wag.
iner•••eS in tb. context of tb. oYerel1 proc••diugs of • National
Jag_ Ca.e, wbicb, besides miniaua wege inor•••••• aight .lao
<#~ H,dul with over-llwerd pllY1llent•••pllrate11. or ain08 1961... 8n
overell total "age inc rea•• , wbic~ incorporate. the ainiaua ~.g'
incr.~8•• 8. well 8. inerea••• in skill ••rgi...
Existing literature which deale with tb. aint.ua "ege in_
creases in t~e overell context of Ratio.al Vage Caeea. can b.
clasaitied aa eit~er leg~l or induatrial relatioDa literature.
The legal literature consiste of the Co.-nnwealth Arbitration
~e~orta. which report the proceedings of each caae .eparat.ly
...~nrl do not contain any analy.ia or diacueaion/aDdAerticlee
vhich .ppear in the Australien L~v Journel. Thea. articles de~l
with v"rioue aspect. of Induatriel Lev end discuea procedure. end
9roceedings in the Conciliation aud Arbitretion Coc~i•• ion from
~ leg~l and qualitative point of view. Typical of auch article.
is that by \.J.Boulton. in the Auetralien Law Journal. wbo die-
cuaee. 'The N8tional "asc Cese. 1975, and tha "Indexation" of
1~~ea'. The article containa an outline of avent. le.ding up to
the 1ecision to introduce the v.~. indexation guideline. in Harch
1975. ~ .u~~8ry of the comment a ~.de by the m.~bera of the Full
~nCh the w~ge indexetion guideline. And • ~p.culativ. discussion~a to' the re"aona tor the introduction of the vage indexationguideline.. The three .uggested rea.ona Boulton put. forvard are -that wave justice demand. the maintenance of the real value of
vage•• that the Co_i•• ion Tie_ the introcluctio a • indexa)
tiOIl liS e Ileana of regainin con of v tion and that
the Co=mi.sion viev. vlIge indexation II. a aeana o~ reetoring pro_
(, )
titAbilit,..
There are also legal reference•••de ia the Australian L"v
Jouralll's ~v Reporta Section. to expreeeioa of opinion by members
of the Full Bench. Such an expr.s.ion concerning Nationo!ll 'Wage t,C.r~ '/
Cases and the .tet. of .ind concerning the opinioll ot the .e.ber '
of the Full Bench in Harch 1969. in relatioll to minimum wage
award. beinS granted on the bllei. of equal pa~. Thi. pftrtic~r
reference wa••ade in connection with the ca.. of the Angli•• Group
in The Au.trela.ian Meat Employees Onion. OTer the que.tion of
,,\
equal pay for vOllen. Since various interpretations and applications
of v~rioua lave ar. clo.ely interaeshed end cro.s reter.nced. dis-
cussion of issues r.le.~nt to lIinimum vega c•••• oan be found in
C9GeS reillted to waKe 8wa~de for particular occupational end in-
du.try "'rOu~
- 3 -
Literetllre which caD be classified as induat:rial :roelatio11S
11ter~ture. Is concerned with issued relevant to induatrlel
relationa in ~eneral and, on occasion. with minimum wege 1n-
cr8esee in Nation~l Wa~e Awards. A 8oholarly article of tb.
'industrial reletions' variety usually diseusse. el•••nta of
lew, economics end p~litic8. ae industrial relations is en
..., ~("interdisciplinary ~.jplkne. Theee artioles ere Wluel17 more
plentiful than those of tbe purely legel Tariet,. The Journal
of Industrial Relations hes an article OD eyer1 NatlODal ~eg.
C~5e, which discus8es minimum w~. increaeea end other aettere
h~8rd at the National Wage C8S88. An .x.~pl. of this type of
~rticle is that by Braham Dabeohek titled 'The 1975 Nations1
0)
~~e Case: Now We Have an Incomes Polict. Dabecheck discusses
the history of the evolution of the vage indexation proposals
in coneiderable detail. The submiesions of the Australian
:Ol'ncil of Tr,"ue Unions, the employers end the COm.r::lonweelth
;overnment Rre ~nalyzed and discuesed in detail. as Bre the
gt~tement3 end decisions of the membere of the Full Bench ~
editoriel coml!lents in various neWSpaperS. In terllll!l of overall
ntyle, these erticles may be described as law reports with Bome
pn~lysis and discussion t~cked on. The discussions in theee
Rrticles "'re contextual in B journ,listic vein rether than
theoretical in en academic vein, although they Bre written by
~cRctemics and legel pr~ctitioner6. The article,in 197~.vas
written by John Niewenhuysen of the University of Melbourne.
who is also the author of the 1973 article.
The only recent publiCRtion whicb diacusaes lIinimua wage
ps well 8S other wa~e awards,in a historiesl context~ rether then
a current affeirs context, is thet wr~tten by Bade Baale,.. a
journalist. 'Federnl Arbitration in Australia: A Historical
( .Outline,,~is an attempted expl~nation of Australia's Federal
~roitretion system, in termo of the hiotorioal events that bave
shaped its evolution and ie a journalistic_style contextual
n~rrative designed for the leYMan. Healey disousses wag. de-
cisiono, personalities and evants of various periods end bas em
ld.s discussion on newspeper reports and Co_tIIoDweeltb Arbit-
ration Reports.
Of the scant re~eBreh work done in ralatad araas. there is
one B~cholor of Lnw (Honours) T~eeie by J. EggiDB, which dis-
Cusses 'The Changing Role of The Coneili~tion and Arbitration
Commission; N~tional ~ago Decieione 195} - 1976. This analyzea
Ilet;onel 1:1"<::0 CIiOOIS in legal e.nd 1natitutionel terJIB rather~
the ~om1","",c.,rnnetl'lc !l"e;,>C'.,fQril: "sed in this c.nal~'51s.
Chan.:c3 in the Ie :::11 fruDlcwork enJ !lroccdurc!:l are annl;rzed,
rather t!Ltln the obj~ct and crlted.ll of the decision IIIllJdng proceos.
B. Dnh3cl.eck, who is cu.rrent.l;r l', If.lcllll"Cr in the Department of
lL-.,'-' _,;t.., ...r
1nJ.U:;Lrlul .t.elt.t.1ons. ~l(:" .:ioutL.J .;l:;. nan nn ongo~ ansl.ys19
o~ the roles or the Yf.rlou:) aetore in the ll.ustralia!l wage f:l:ui-
lion 11'Ocosc;cntitled 'The Role of 'rho i..C. T.0, Wa.;e Indexation) !fr h e4-
and In""cotl2 Policy: I The Role of The Comdssion In .1ustrali.e.nJ g~ 1/ ">
;:a:;c tcrr.linatlon. ~ ..."
Thus it con bo concluded INri the above survey that the
hietorical quantitative ar.a17s1s and research for possible fac-
lors on 'Which tho membors of the Full. Bench consiatently base
the lIIllcn1tooe of increases av.u-ded in the min1IIIum vage. and henoe,
the status of such increases in regard to 1II8.l'g1nal. pllrcentage
increases in the mini.m1.l:l wage. con3tituteJoriginal. research.
/
,
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An Insti tutiond and-Historical Introduction_to_ The
COmmonwealth COnciliation and Arbitration and To Its
- - --Administration of Minimum Wage Awardsa
- - -
A The Institutional COntext.
The Federal arbitration system directly affects more than
two million people in all States. This comes about by the machinery
set up under legislation in 1904, which provided for the establishment
of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration _ which
became known simply as the Arbitration COurt. Under further
legislation in 1956-the COmmonwealth COnciliation and Arbitration
COmmission was set up.
Although the Arbitration Court is still in existence, it
has not sat since 1956, so from that year on we are concerned only
with the Arbitration Collll'll1ssion - its more common name. This body
is the most important industrial tribunal in Australia. Its
decisions are generally taken as the standard for action by the
several State industrial tribunals. This does not mean there is
great jealousy between the various wage-fixing systems, but rather
a willing acceptance of national standards.
The Constitution, under which the States became a Federation
on 1 January 1901, gave the new Federal Parliament the power to
make laws with respect to 'conciliation and arbitration for the
prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond
the limits of anyone State.' \..<'i I
So when Federal Parliament set up the new Federal arbitration
system, there was an inbuilt limited power on just what it could
do. The tribunal could only involve itself in industrial disputes
which were interstate in character. Provided this quaHfication
woJ
we5& met, the tribunal would hear both sides of the dispute, and
would reach a decision as to what were to be the working conditions
or rates of payor both. This would be documented and so become a
Federal award, taking precedence over any State tribunal or other
award.
More than two million out of Australia's five million
workforce are covered by the decisions-known either as awards or
..determinations-of State tribunals. These tribunals regulate
working conditions and rates of payor both, which arise from
industrial disputes which are only intrastate in character. State
tribunals differ slightly 1n name and composition. For example,
Victoria and Tasmania have wages
representatives of employers and
Queensland and Western Australia
boards-comprising a chairman and
trade unions. New SOuth Wales,
/!have industrial commissions.
Commonwealth public servants-numbering more than 200,OOO-are
,<
indirectly tied to the Federal arbitration system. Their pay rates
and working condi tion are set by the Commonweal th Public Service
Board. In the event of non-agreement between the Board and the
unions there is provision for the Public Service Arbitrator to set
the pay figures and working conditions. But appeals against the
Arbitrator's decisions can be taken to a Full Bench of the
Arbitration Commission. and this is how public servants of the
CollllllOnweal th are tied i'l.to the system.
The Arbitration Commission comprises lawyers who are deputy-
presidents with the title of Mr Justice, md the laymen who are co_
=fssioners or conciliators. Both groups have charge of all the
Federal awards, which number about 700~ These awards or decisions I
given in the process of 'settling an interstate industrial dispute'/Y,
are an important part of the contract of employment, which binds
both employers and workers.
Wi thin the Federal arbi tration system there is the Common-
wealth Industrial Court, whose members are judges. Part of the
Court's function is to decide questions of law relating to the
rules of registered organisations, to interpret awards and to
impose penalties for breaches of the Federal awards.
In recent years the term 'National Wage Case' has been used
frequently. It is certainly a most important feature of the
Australian system. Issues involving very wide application, such as
increases in the total wage. changes in long service leave provisions,
and extra annual leave. are dealt with by the Full Bench of the
Arbitration Commission. Such cases are known as national ones.
because their decisions flow quickly and automatically to all
Federal awards. State tribunals then usually follow the Federal lead.
A simple example of such a case would be the lodging of a
claim for an increase of a certain amount by the A.C.T.U. on behalf
of a nUlllber of unions. The A.C.T.U. would select e particuflar award
and claim e nse in its pay rates by that amount. The application
would be put forward as a 'test case' for all other Federal awards.
The employer organisations, in refusing to grant the claim.
immediately bring about an interstate industrial dispute. The Full
Bench of the Arbitration Commission then decides the 'test case'.
In such cases the Commonwealth Government intervenes in the 'pUblic
interest' and outs submissions to the Full Bench on the state of
the economy and the effect of such a change.
These national cases heard by the Full Bench of the Commission
take place in either Melbourne or Sydney.
B _ The Development of ~mum Wage and Associated Awards.
The basic wage concept dates. from nd until 1961 the
Ittf-<' .....'basic wage itself had been ~ived at intervals, first by the
Arbitration Court, and after 1956, by the Arbitration Commission,
but the Full Bench felt in 1961 that the time was right to launch a
new approach, and that the only issue in February 1962 relating to
the basic wage would be why the money wages fixed at July 1961 should
not be adjusted in accordance with any change in the COnsumer Price
Index. In order to give effect to this decision the Bench i!Idjourned
the union's basic wage increase application until 20 February 1962.
The Australian COuncil of Trade Unions' advocate, Hr.R.J.Hawke.
argued during the case that if the Bench provided for automi!ltic
quarterly cost-Of-living adjustments, ~the necessity to consider the
state of the economy would disappear]> Economist Sr. Douglas Copland,
who appeared as a witness for the unions, agreed with him. He
thought it more desirable for the COmmission to fix a basic wage
every three years when it would consider the state of the economy,
including long-term trends and improvement in productivity over a
period, i!Ind between such fixations to have some machinery whereby
the purchi!lsing power of the basic wage Wi!lS protected against price
rises./'
In earlier cases comments had been made from the Bench that
( a better index should be prOVided, as the old 'C' Series Index
I'"~{~. hi!ld become unrelii!lble owing~st-war effects; but in the 1961
decision the Ful nch si!lid the emergence of the new Consumer
Price Index, to replace the 'C' Series Index, had removed some
difficulties, since it had enabled the Full Bench to fix a standard
more likely to be properly maintainable than previously. IF
The Full Bench si!lid it hi!ld determined i!IS best i!IS it could
from time to time the highest basic wage in money which the economy
could susti!lin. One of the fi!lctors considered was movement in prices.
But while the COmmission preferred the Consumer Price Index to the
'e' Series Index, it was not prepi!lred to assume that the new index
would at all times so accurately measure movements in reti!lil prices
that an automatic adjustment could be made to the basic wage.
The application of the Consumer Price Index should always be subject
to control by the Commission, which should be able to decide whether
e particuler increase or decrease in the Consumer Price Index figures
should be applied to the basic wage. The application of the Consumer
Price Index should always be subject to control by the Gommdssion,
which should be able to decide whether a particular increase or
decrease in the Consumer Price Index figures should be applied to the
basic wage. Consideration of prices, the Full Bench said, should
take place annually. 'We will each year make the assumption that the
effect of movements in the Consumer Price Index should be reflected
in the basic wage, unless we are persuaded to the contrary by those
seeking to oppose the change' • ..(11'(
It seemed that once the question of prices was dealt with
in accordance with the Consumer Price Index e review of the economy
and in particular of productivity increases could more properly take
place at longer intervels-every three or four years. The basic wage
fixed in 1961 had taken into account productivity up to June 1960
and therefore the Commdssion anticipated not haVing to review the
real basic wage for some three years. The Bench also said the onus
would be on any party opposing such an alteration to show why it
should not be made.
If the price index had risen, the unions had to rely solely on
that fact. It would then be for the employers to show either that
the increase in prices was of exceptional character and should not
be reflected in e basic wage increase or that there was some other
special factor in the economy which would make the increase inadvisabl,
The Bench said one of the difficulties of an annual review was
the making of a satisfactory assessment of the economy from the
long-range viewpoint every twelve months. By adopting the new
procedure the Commission felt it would be able more properly to
examine the economy and not be too greatly influenced by short-run
changes from year to year.
Productivity had been mentioned in various jUdgments by the
Commission and the only issue in relation to this SUbject between
the parties was whether productivity could be measured with
reasonable accuracy and whether employees had, through wage increases,
received their share of increased productiVity.
The employers said
calculeting productivity.
the unions had different methods fOr
Sir Douglas Coplend used a method in
5which special emphasis was given to population. On the other
hand, Kr. Hawke , for the Australian Council of Trade Unions,
submitted that productivity based on employment was i!I better guide
from the point of view of wage fixation. ~v
The employers used yet another system for assessing productiv-
ity. They urged the Full Bench to look at average earnings as a true
indication of whether increases in productivity had been distributed
to the workforce.
The Full Bench replied that it had to make i!I decision on
actual amounts, and could not give approximate increases. It granted
an increase of 12s. to the basic wage, saying this would bring wages
up to the purchasing power of the year before. Lf
The Hin1.mum Wage Concept.
By the end of 1968 the trade union movement was already
devoting some study to the question of 8 minimum type wage. The
minimum wage should not be confused with the basic wage concept.
When the minimum wage was introduced in 1966 it was higher than
the basic wage and was 1n fact a 'little' total wage. It was set
as a figure below which no Federal award worker could be paid. It
did not apply where workers were receiving wages in excess of the
amount fixed.
Originally under the old system a basic wage increase went
throughout all Federal and most State awards, benefiting nearly
all the workforce irrespective of the level of their salaries.
The minimum wage applies specifically and only to low wage earners,
who are not getting a sufficient over-award payment. The minimum
wage can be altered without involving a general across-the-board
increase.
The minimum wage came into existence in this way. In 1966
the Full Bench of the Arbitration Commission ordered a detailed
examination into the 330 classifications in the Metal Trades award,
and gave the task initially to Commissioner T.C.Winter.
Apart from ordering an investigation into the Metal Trades
award, the Full Bench also introduced a minimum wage. The presiding
judge, Mr. Justice Wright, said at the time that some temporary
improvement should be made to 31 classifications in the award,
pending the outcome of Commissioner Winter's inquiry. There was no
evidence as to the prevalence of over-award payments in this area
and the new increases to low wage earners' r8tes were not intended
to be 8dded to any extt8 a1x>ve-the-aw8rd payments.
'The object of this proposal', said Hr.Justice wright, 'is
to relieve the position of lowly paid workers, who are on award
~>
rates pending further eX8mination of their position.'
Mr. Justice Moore, dealing with the question of the 'low
wage earner', said the problem associated with this group had been
raised by the President in the 1961 basic wage case. In 1966
employers had suggested that there might be 8 special inquiry into
the problems of low w8ge earners, but that no special action should
be taken ooncerning them at this stage.
The jUdge said an increase in the basic wage would help
the low wage earners, because the basic w8ge formed a high percentage
of their income. '1.. 3
;r This is a crude method of
of lower paid workers because it
attempting to improve the position
gives an equal increase to 811, if
•
but it does give some relief. On this occasion, when for the first
~ tilDe the Commission has competing claims about both basic wage andmargins, the Commission can in my view without further inquiry attemptt'~ some other and special measure to meet the condition of the low wageearners. It seems to me proper to write into the Ketal Tr8des
8ward a provision that no employee working under the award shall
receive as actual pay less than the sum of the basic wage applicable
to him 8nd an amount of S3.75 a week. This will have the effect of
ensuring th8t low Wl.ge earners employed under the Metal Trades award
will receive an increase which should improve their economic situat-
ion. They are probably not great in number and the amelioration of
r l1..<,il¥-
their circumstances should not have any great economic erfect overall.
He pointed out that this provision would only be an interim
one. What happened to it in future would depend on the results of
the work value inquiry to be undertaken by Commissioner Winter.
,
He Justice Moore also said it might ~ might not be appropriate
to do in other industries what was being done in the metal trades.
The rate for other industries, he said, might have to be different
from that for metal trades, but some step would have to be taken to
improve the position of low wage earners under other awards. 't5
The Full Bench, dealing with the introduction of the
minimum wage, at that stage said consideration had been given to
31 out of the 330 classifications in the Metal Trades award. The
classifications in question had a lower range of marginal rates-from
as little as 90 cents a week to 53.60 a week1-' The new provision
inserted in the award prescribed that 'no adult male employees shall
be paid as a weekly wage for working the standard hours of work,
prescribed by clause 11 and 12, less than the following respective
sums:
537.25 in New South Wales; 536.45 in Victoria, except at
Yallourn, Hazel Power Station and Morwell Briquette Project (S37.l0);
534.75 in Queensland; in South Australia 536.05, except at Whyalla
and Iron Knob (536.55); in Tasmania 537.15, but within 10 miles
of the chief post office, Launceston, 536.75. 'Z..'
The different rates in the States were due to the varying
basic wage figures. These differences came about because of the
var~figures in the cost of living adjustments, measured by the
index, between the States.
The Full Bench said it was not intended 0 affect the wage
of any employee who was already receiving the prescribed minimum
wage (through over-award payments). 10K
The concept of a minimum wage was also written into other
Federal awards in 1966. In 1967 the Full Bench, in introducing
the total wage for the first time also retained the minimum wage.
In deciding to merge the old basic wage and the margin for
skill-as had been sought by the employers since 1964_the Bench said
the minimum wage would give:
(1) Better protection to those whose needs were greatest,
namely those whose take-home pay would otherwise be
below the standard assessed by the Commission.
(2) More flexibility in assisting them, because the Com-
mission would have more scope to give them special
1..9
consideration.
The Full Bench in 1967 added a 51 increase for that year to
the new minimum wage. In the words of this decision: 'Industrial
justice demands that this standard should be reviewed regularly so
that the special position of the low wage earners will be constantly
attended to·. ;,.
in touch with reallt¥
8
'!'ce,--To;.:..tC·Cl"-CW:.~g~•....:co~n~c~e~p~t~.•
The basic w~ge incre~ses in the late 19505 and early 19605
sew new demands for changes in the level of the rate for the margin
for Sk~} on the ground that frequent increases 1n the basic wage
~ the gap between the unskilled and the skilled person 1n terms
of money for his level of skill. At one stage applications for
increases 1n both basic wage and margins were submitted at the same
time.
Employers became concerned at the frequent Changes-in both
basic wage and margins-so they took a logical step. Why not abolish
the concept of a basic wage, which had been 1n existence since 1907,
and substitute. single wage-the total wage-which would embrace basic
wage and margins. Jf
They argued that in the ell;rly part of the century the concept
of a basic wage~r living wage-had real meaning. But in the post-
World War II era this was nothing more than a sentimental element of
the overall wage. Workers, they said, were more concerned with what
their total wage amounted to rather than how much went into the basic
wage, or how much was for margin for skill. 3'-
After the Arbitration Court suspended automatic cost-of-living
adjustments in 1953 examination of the basic wage section was
conducted at regUlar intervals by the Arbitration COurt <later the
Arbitration Commission). On the other hand, examination of the
margins section of the wage was conducted at irregular intervals.
For example, cases dealing with the level of margins for skill
tookplace in 1947, 1952, 1959 and 1963 wheras basic wage cases were
heard four times between 1956 and 1964. With each margins assessment
the Australian Council of Trade Unions argued that the previous
relationship between the basic wage and the margin for skill had been
upset, and that the relationship should be restored by cha~ng the
level of the basic wage. 3 ?
The employers' organisation claimed that if both basic wage
and margins could be examined at a single hearing, this would combat
the unions' arguments that changes had to be made 50 as to maintain
the relativity between the two elements of the wage, and moreover if
these two elements could be combined 1n one single or total wage,
this would be more realistic from a wage fixing viewpoint and more
1'1-
The employers in the 1963 margins case before the Full Bench
of the Arbitration COmmission had put forward a theory of adjusting
wages within gains in productivity. This had been the subject of
=rgument before the Bench for some years.
In the 1964 Full Bench hearing the employers had an applica-
tion which asked for the removel of the basic wage from the Metal
Trades award. and its replacement by a total wage. Their application
also sought increases in wages-to be conditional upon the Bench's
agreeing that 'wages should be kept within movements in productivity'.
The employers' theory was put in this way:
Hovements 1n both wages and productivity should be in con-
sonance with each other. If movements in wages exce~ed movements
in productivity, then there would be either an increase in prices
or a drift from profits. Increases in prices were economically and
socially undesirable and were inconsistent with the desirable object
of price stability. A drift from profits was also undesirable
because it would adversely impede economic growth.
The employers suggested that the COmmission could properly
adjust wages annually within the limits of long-term productivity,
which on recent performance had been est1mi!lted at between I and 2 per
cent a year.
Such procedure, they said, would ensure a just and eqUitable
distribution of productivity increi!lses to employees. as well as
ensuring price stability and economic growth.
The employers submitted that each year the Commission should
look i!lt all the factors in the economy to see where, in the 1 to 2
per cent range, that year's increase would be. For 1964 the increase
should be 2 per cent ~md this should be added to the total wage and
flow to ell Fed~al awards. 3,
The Australian Council of Trade Unions argued strongly
ageinst the abolition of the basic wage and stressed its importance
to lower Wage earners. Their 4dvocate, Me R.J.Hawke, maintained
that the proposals for payment out of productivity ..-ould be quite
unworkable because the essential ~ontrols did not exist.
The Full Bench said that, despite the attractiveness of
greater simplicity an~ predictability, they could not implement the
employers' proposal
(at any rate at the present time, particularly as it has not
yet been successfully applied elsewhere••••••••Looking back
on history one may argue that it was perhaps vital that the
basic wage or something very like it should have come into
being••••• On the other hand, it may be that if one was now
to start afresh and was charged with bringing into operation
a national wage code, one wauld not worry about creating a
basic wage or anything similar to it••••• 8ut it is history
that a basic wage became and remained a national phenomenon
and the real problem is
remains of value in the
whetJler that phenomenon still
,1 ,
field of national wage fixation.
So the Bench concluded that the employers in 1964 had failed
to demonstrate that the total wage approach was pref&able-al though
it might be different if the Commission was to Iring into operation
a national wage code for the first time.
In December 1964 the employers again asked the Arbitration
COmmdssion to introduce a total wage in 1965.
But they used a different approach. The application was in
alternative parts, and in broad terms sought a merging of the
basic wage and margin for skill plus a 1.5 per cent increase in
total wage)1 A condition of the wage increase offer was that there
would be no other increaseof any kind under the Metal Trades award
(the 'test' award for all others in the Federal system) before
31 December 1966.
Part 'A' of the employer's claim in effect sought the
abolition of the concepts of basic wage and margins, and the
introduction into the Metal Trades award of an obligation to pay
a total wage, made up of the sum of the amounts expressed in terms
of basic wage and a margin, plus an amount equivalent to 1 per cent
of such sum.
Part 'B' of the claim did not seek the deletion of basic
wage and margins, but allowed retention end sought both to be
varied by reducing the basic wage by 68. and adding 65. to magins,
plus 1 per cent of the wage then payable.
In the Part 'B' alternative the emp1o~er8 asked that in the
ensuing twelve months the level of basic wage and margins. so far
as the latter was determined upon economic grounds, should be
decided simultaneously.1'f
The Full Bench gave a majority judgment on 29 June 1965a
Mr Justice Gallagher, HI Justice Sweeney and Mr Justice
Nimmo said that as far as the Part 'A' application was concerned,
the Commission should not depart from its 1964 attitUde! '1 The
Part 'B' application did not involve disappearance of basic wage
and margins, but merely called for a decision whether the Bench
should deal with both on general economic grounds at the same tlmea
The Part 'B' application enabled them to apply an increase to basic
wage alone, margins alone or partly to one and partly to the othera
Simultaneous consideration of the two elecents of the wage on
general economic grounds would remove a source of friction represented
~
by ~egac~ claims (changes in the basic wage upsetting the relativity
to mUg1:'ns and therefore sparking off fresh claims) a
?
The majority decision of the Bench said it had no hesitation
in accepting the Part 'B' application, and this approach was more
likely to produce coherence and consistency in decisions on
national wage cases than were separate hearings. 4,,0
The jUdges said they would not adjust the basic wage with
movements in the COnsumer Price Index, as sought by the Australian
COuncil of Trade Unions. A simultaneous determination of the
appropriate levels for basic wage and margins would be made for the
ensuing twelve months. No increase would be made to the basic wage
as such, but metal trades margins would be increased by 1.5 per cent
of the sum of the six capital cities' basic wage and the margin.
Thus for a fitter whose six capital cities' basic wage was 3085. and
his margin 106s., the 1.5per cent increase of the total 4l4s. gave
4/him an increase of 6s.
The minority decision by the President, Sir Richard Kirby,
and Mr Justice Moore was that they would have increased the basic
4'-
wage by 8s.
The President said it was clear from the employers'
submissions that the abolition of basic wage and margins sought in
Part 'A' was not dependent on their argument that movements in
award wages should be kept within movements in productivity. But
he felt this part of the cla1JD. should be dism.1sseda ~]
The minority jUdgment also said that while there was some
merit in dealing wit~ both elements of the wage simUltaneously they
would not accede to the request. q.y.
The employers' battle to secure the total wage concept
gained some ground in 1966. In that year the employers again
sought a total wage and the Australian Council of Trade Unions, on
behalf of the trade unions, wanted increases in both basic wage and
margins. Two Full Benches sat concurrently to deal with these two
aspects.
The employers put in a two-pronged application. They wanted
the basic wage and the margins elements deleted and the total amount
of the wage increased by 1.5 per cen~. Alternatively they sought
that the basic wage be increased by 30 cents a week and margins by
1 per cent, together with an increase of 0.5 per cent of the
increased basic wage .end Il..ergins. If';-
The decision w.es given on 8 July 1966.
The presiding jUdge, Mr Justice Wright, said there were two
basic considerations and several subsidiary ones, which led him to
conclude that 'the time is opportune for the adoption of the concept
of a total wage'. On merit he favored an immediate change to the
~,
format of a total wage, but there waS some advantage 1n deferring it.
Mr .Justice Gallagher said that not withstanding his
unequivocal statements in the 1964 decision rejecting the total wage
approach, he had come round to thinking in 1966 that the 'time 1s now
approaching for the introduction of a total wage system,~1 His
reasons were:
(1) Participation in the 1965 decision that there should be
an annual review of the economy by a single bench and
a simultaneous determination of the basic wage and
margins level for the following twelve months.
(2) The circumstances of 1966 in which the basic wage and
margins claims were heard together, and the likelihood
of this procedure being followed. A simultaneous hearing
would conveniently enable consideration of wage rates as
a whole and would obviate the necessity for separate
assessments.
(3) Under the system now being followed an employee would be
expected to think in terms of his wage rate as a whole
and not in terms of so much for basic wage and so much
for margins.
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(4) The circumstances that special provision was about
be made for employees on lower margins ( ~
Hr Justice Gallagher said he again rejected the employers'
productivity theorem-the movem@l\t of wages within the expected
productivi...: range. 4: q
Mr Justice Moore, who 8180 rejected this theorem, Said
that a pattern of wage fixation had developed through 1961, 1963
and 1964 and this was dls~bed by the majority decision of 1965.
Although he disagreed with the 1965 decision, it was a fact of
industrial life to which some weight had to be given.
(This, together with the arguments of the employers as to the
desirability of the Total Wage Concept, now inclines me to
the view, that the Commission should probably ultimately accept
the concept••••but wage fixation must be dynamic and those
involved ill it prepared to accept change when change becomes
necessary•••••• I am not prepared to do more than state that
subject to further argument, I am inclined now to the view
that when we finally deal with secondary wages in this award,
the wages should be expressed as total wages.' s- 0
The Full Bench declined to alter margins at the time, pending
a work value investigation into the Ketal Trades award. Hr.Justice
Hoae said it was essential that before such a step was taken, notice
shOuld be given to all concerned, inclUding governments, both
Commonwealth and States. It would give State industrial authorities
an opportuni ty to consider their position and mi.ght possibly lel!d to
a conference of State industrial authorities.
Commissioner T. C. Winter, who was also a member of one of
the two Benches which sat concurrently, said he would not implement
a total wage at this stage. However, he would serve notice on all
that the Commission should consider the question of prescribing a
toti!l1 wage. ~/l
In 1967, in the National Wage Case, the President, Sir
Richard Mrby, Me Justice Gallagher, Me Justice Moore and COmmdssioner
Winter announced the introduction of a total wage.
14
These members had sat on two Full Benches simultaneously
and had to decide two questions:
(1) Whether there should be an increase in award rates of
pay.
(2) ftnether any increase should be added to basic wage or
expressed in a total wage.
In the decision they said the base wage had become a
tr8dition in AustI,!I1ian wage fixation.fl.For some it meant the
wage of an unskilled employee, to many it meant the lowest wage
paid 1n their industry.
Some regard it as an assessment by the Commission of a
family wage, but such an assessment hasrot for many years been
undertaken or sought.
For the Commission not one of these meanings is opt,
because the basic wage is 1n substance defined by the Act to mean
that wage or part of a wage fixed without regard to the work upon
or the industry 1n which a man is employed.
The Commdssion's basic wage had become 1mpo~nt in three
ways; it had guaranteed a minimUJll wage to workers under its awards;
it had been the means of giving general wage increases on economic
grounds and the secondary wage (margin for skill) had been built
on it; and it had played a significant part in improving wage
standards.
( Since the famous Harvester decision of Hr Justice Higgins
some 60 years ago, the basic wage has served the workers of
Australia well. It has been the keystone of our wages system
and has had a special quality. But in our view the time has
come to overhaul our time-honored system because a course is
now open which is more consonant with modern requirements
and which Lt the same time will give better protection to
employees.
retain the
July 1966)
We should now express wages as total wages and
minimum concept introduced by the Commission in
5.',
The new approach would ensure thl!lt under FederallWards, wage
and salary earners would receive annually increases on economic
grQunds to the whole wage. There would be greater flexibility and
15
We have not taken this step lightly. In four consecutive
years the Commission has been called upon to consider
applications of one sort or another for the abolition of the
basic wage and
the adoption of a Total Wage. The applications of 1964 and 1965
were rejected. but there was an acceptance in principle of the
application of 1966. Notwithstanding that acceptance in principle,
if upon further reflection a reasonable doubt had remained as to
the wisdom of changing a long-established system, those involved
last year would have been prepared to revert to earlier views.
However no member of either Bench entertains such a doubt .. '
As a result of the adoption of the total wage concept the
COmmission was able to handle the annual review and the total
wage fleXibly.
increase could
in 1967 )'9r in
An
a flat Sl
tie the hands of
either be given as a flat amount (it was
varying amounts. No attempt was made to
futue Full Benches in their decisions on total
wage increases.
The increase in 1968 was 11.35_a flat amount.
the rise was 3 per cent.. It was 6 per cent in 1970.
National Wage case was put off until 1972).
Wage Indexation - Introduced in 1975
But in 1969
(The 1971
The introduction of a form of wage indexation in the 1975
National Wage case (30th April, 1975) represented another attempt
by the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission to
regain control of wages.
The Full Bench of the COmmission (Moore J. President,
Robinson and Ludeke JJ., Isaac J.Deputy President, Mr. Taylor,
Public Service Arbitrator, and Mr.PortU5. Commissioner) had to
consider claims by the unions for: (1) wage "indexation" in the
form of automatic quarterly adjustments of the total wage based on
movements in the Consumer Price Index (hereinafter "CoOP .. I."); (2)
an increase in the total wage; and (3) an increase in the
minimum wage together with indeXation of that wage. The unions'
claim for indexation of the total wage was by far the major issue
for consideration by the Commission.. The claim was supported by
the COmmonwealth Government and by the States of South Australia
and Tasmania, although there were differences between the proponents
of indexation as to. inter alia, the form which indexation should
take. The unions claimed that full percentage indexation should
be applied quarterly and automatically to all award rates whereas
the Commonwealth Government proposed full percentage indexation
only of those award rates up to and inclUding the figure for
Average Weekly Earnings, with other award rates being adjusted
by the C.PaI. percentage of the Average Weekly Earnings figure
("plateau" indexation). The private employers and the States of
New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia
opposed all forms of wage indexation.
The claim for wage indexation in the 1975 National Wage
c~se was not novel a The unions have consistently sought some
type of automatic cost of living adjustment since such adjus~ts
to the basic wage were discontinued in the Commonwealth jurisdiction
in 1953. (The history of wage indexation is examined in Wage
Indexation for Australia? A Discussion Paper, Australian Department
of Labor and Immigration, 1975a) The COmmission, just as consis-
tently, has refused to restore automatic adjustments although
movements in the C.P.Ia have clearly been an important factor taken
into account in national wage cases. "The main reason for the
repeated rejection.a.(being) the Commission's preference, under a
system of annual reviews, to keep wage adjustments under its
direct control in order to be able to apply the size and form of
increase in pay in a flexible way from year to year depending
on the circumstances prevailing at the time"}G In its 1975 decision
the commission, without altogether abandoning this view, introduced
a foe. of wage indexation.
After noting the current serious economic situation (the
high level of unemployment, the negative productivity growth in
1974, the high rate of inflation and the substantial fall in
profitability), the Commission offered the unions a package deal
which included a form of indexation a "(W)e are of the view that
some form of wage indexation would contribute to a more rational
system of wage fixation, tomore orderly, more equitable and less
inflationary wage increases and to better industrial relations,
provided that indexation was part of a package which included
appropriate wage fixing principles and the necessary 'supporting
mechanisms' to ensure their Viability." However, having approved
indexation in principle, the Commission was not willing to introduce
an integrated system of wage indexation without giving the opponents
of indexation an opportunity of advancing their views on the
proposed indexation package and without some test in the field ~
to see whether the wage fixing principles to operate in conjunction
with indexation would be observed by the unions a
For these reasons, the Commission adjusted all award wages
for the full percentage increase in the C.P.Ia for the
w~ge determination set out in the decision would be observed.
It also announced its intention of making a further ~djustment
fdUowing the publication of the June 1975 qu~rter C.P.I., provided
that there was substantial compliance with the conditions for
indexation, and it invited all concerned to make submissions on
,.r
the new wage determin~tion principles when it~ to consider
whether the adjustment should be made.
The principles of wage determination set out in the
Commission's decision were:
1. Award wages and salaries to be adjusted each quarter
in relation to the most recent movement of the six-capitals C.P.I.,
unless it is persuaded to the contrary by those seeking to oppose
the adjustment.
2. The CollUllission will sit in April, July, OCtober and
January following the publication of the latest C.P.I. It is
envisaged that such hearings will be short.
3. Any adjustment in wage and salary award rates on account
of C.P.I. should operate from the beginning of the first pay period
commencing on or after the 15th of the month following the issue
of the quarterly C.P.I.
4. The form of index~tion will be determined by the tollUllission
in the light of circumstances and the submissions of the parties,
provided that an increase of less than 2 per cent in anyone quarter
should be applied fully to all award rates.
5. No wage adjustment will be made unless the movement in
the C.P.I. was at least I per cent. A movement of less ~n I per
cent will be carried forward to the following quarter or quarters
and an adjustment will occur when the accumulated moveaent equals
1 per cent or more.
6. Each ye~r the Commission will consider what increDse in
the total wage should be awarded on account of productivity.
7. other grounds for pay increases are -
(a) changes in work value such as changes in the nature of
work, skill and responsibility required, on the conditions
under which the work is performed; and
c8ses where ~w8rds h8ve not been consid@r@d in the
light of last ye8r's community movements. These cases
m8Y be reviewed to determine whether they would qU~lify
for ~ wage incre8se but C8re must be exercised to ensure
th~t they ~re genuine c~tch-up c~ses 8nd not le8pfrogging.
The compression of rel~tivities that has occurred in
~wards in recent years does not provide grounds for
special wage increases to correct the compression.
8. Any applic8tions under paragraph 7 above, whether by
consent or otherwise, will be tested against the principles laid
down, and viewed in the context of the requirements for the success
of indexation. The Commission should gu~rd ~gainst contrived
work-v81ue agreements and other methods of circumventing the
indexation plan. ~$'
These are the guidelines currently in force.
/'
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IThe factors cOBcerning which hypothe... viII b•••d. are
eas.utiaIIy economic in character, in that thsy are .ostly baaed
on economic indicators published by tb. Commonve.lth Bur••• ot
(, \Steteetece and adjusted and standardi.ed in 80•• instances by
tb. Institute ot Ipplied Economic.Ad. 60ci.l Re.s.rcb\<'~. rev
det. is that concerning such econoaic factora ~a the Consu••r
Price !ndex 9 tb. Average Wage Indez. percentage incre8s.. in
un.8plo~.nt, tb. D~b.r ot working d.7. loat, gro.8 do••etio
product, and tb. percentaga increase in the .i~ vage granted
by the Full Bench at National Wag. c&s•••f~)
Fro. tb••• raw det. bas•• , Indape.adant Tari.bl•• ar. COB-
structed, in .uch~~th.t tb.y ara expre••ed 1B t.~ of ••rgiaal
percentage varietioos. e~d. iR the eese ot vese i.erease.,
marginal pereant.se ditference.. Kargin.l percentage vari.tioos
are the operat~-eriaDles tor inflatioa, hich ie e~pre••ed in
terms of .duI~s unemployed, industrial-unre.t, which i. expressed
terms of the D~erof workiDg days lost aDd productivity, which
is based on gross domestic product. Th. general formula which ia
used for deriving marginal percentage v.riationa in each of theae
variables ia a. follow5:_
!HPV (v.rl~b'e) • «Variable _ Variable (lag))!Variable lag) ~ 100where Var1abl.(lag) is the ~alue of the vari.ble applicable to theprevious n~tion~l w.·e c~se. ill which ainimu. wage increeaea are
•in
aWl!'rded.
The ~Ar~iD.l percent~~e ditferencea .re the UDita uaad to
ev~luate the miniaum WA~e incre••ea awarded in the previous national
wnge C3se and the increaaes occurring in the avarage waga, which
renecta .11 "'a!;8 illcreesea aWArded, as well e. the lIIillimWII wage
1 increases.awarded The gener~l tormula tor the marginel percantage
difference,tencaforth referred to a. the MPD ia a. followa:-
MPD(V8ge) = MPY(wl'lge) _ MPV(CoDSuaer Price Index).
The data tor the independent variable MPV(WDL) is basad on tbe
nuaber at working days lost tram the dete at tbe previoue .iniaua
wage increaae was bended doVll to the date ~he given glniaus wage in-
c ~ a ia handed doVll. The date regerdi~~be i~ep!Ddent variebl~
MPD(HW) nd all the other indepeDdent verieble. 18 baaed on raw data
values for tbe quarter preceding the quarter ia wkicA tb. ainima.
" ~wage increeee ia award ad. Altbougb tb. ti.e intervals between the
~inimum wa~e ~w~rds ~ary in length, it is aaauaed tbat this 1e co.-
pensated for by corresponding variations in tbe .agnitnde of the dat~
Incre~ e~in the n~tionAl ainimus v~g•• whether granted
6opltr.. tely or 'la " COlllnonent of the totsl wag., lIa1. for
reference nurpo~.g. b. c8t.~oriz.d ~8 either above inrI.ticn,
in ISne with inflation, or below inflatioa. However, the••
~re not nominel e~tegori.s. as th.,. 118" appear to b••t first
sir-ht, but rether, they are intervel categori... A giveD mini-
mum wage award me,. b. further abo•• or below inrI.ticD th••
another wage award.
The relationship to inflation of • giveD .ini.ua wage ewerd
IIsy be c.lcul.ted by th. formula:_
MPD (HW) .. HPV (M",) _ MPV (oPI).· ~.. <.. G L>tA
'" wolt r" -
where HPV (InI) '" HI( '" H....hg l 4 ,rA. ~, • _ pr
",nd HPV (CPI) .. CPI _ CPIbg. 'It ~ ~~"I),(/~-c:l)
HPO (HW) i. th. ~bbr.vietion of th. Mergiaal Percentage
Difference of the mini~~ wage, her.after ref.rr.d to a. HPD (MY).
HPV (HW) end HPV (CPI) refer to marginal percentage .ariatio~
i3 the aini=uQ w~ge award and on the co~u.er pric. ind.% res_
pecti••l,.. HW r.pres.nts the perceutllge increalile grRlted at •
~iveu hearing, end MWlag represent. the percentage increase in
the minim~ wage granted at the pre.ions hearing, end CPI re_
present. the consumer price index figure for the quart.r pr.ced_
ing that in which the ~iven mini~ua wege award is increased, and
~CPIl~g represents the consumer pric. index figure for the qunrt~r
lr" _ loU, e ","", iO\1- d.;'Il.I.."U.'3'" .;::e increase.
)
Marginal percentege .~ri.ti8~ are the p.rcentag. incr••enta
to the value of a given variable. Th. concern her. is with the
anal,.sia of relations between such changea in independent var-
i.bles. and the effects such marginel percentage differences heve
on the dependent varieble (HPD(MW).
In order to evaluate the influence which various economic
factors have on variations in the dep.ndent variable. HPD(HW).
~nd whether such vari.tiona rend.r the ••lu. of MPD(M~) peaiti•• ,
zero or negative. corresponding to abo•• inflation. at inflation
level .nd h.low iufl,tion le••l hypothe••a are .ade concerning the
relationship betw.en MPD(MW) and ather varieble. which, according
to .conomic th.or,., end, or g.Derell~ held beliefe. are likel~ to
affect variations of HPD(HW). Th••e hypoth•••• er. then te.ted b,.
means of Pearson product mo.ent corr.lstioAS. for pairs of var-
i~ble$. parti~l corr.lation snalysi. and .ultipl. regression ana_
lysia, which are related t.chnique.. The 'ear.oD corr.l~t1on co-
efficient is a zero order correlation, because no controle for the
influence of otber veriablea er••ad.. It 1. a.sed to lllellaure tb.
etren~tb of relations between two inter.el type vllriebles. such .8~
the dependent variable HPO(HW) pnd one of the ind.pend.nt v~riabl.a
HPV(CPI), and. when the Pearson eorrelatio'a. coefficient is squar.d,
tbe proportion of .eriable in one .ariebl••xplaiued by t~. other.
'rhe l.'bsolute value of the Pearson correlatiOI1 coefficient, /
/l/Jrn .
•s i5~t e ease w1th the partial correlatioa coefficients, variea
:tt..uo 0 sndl'_ If the Ilagnitude of the coefficient is cloae
to ODe it is 8D indication that there Is a strong relatioaship
~tt ...een the variables concerned. If it is clos8 to aero the /
'el .. tiol1J3hip is rehtivel,. weak. If it Is lee.!l thea'l000 it is
. 5"
'lrtuall,. Don-existent.
Partial correlation snalysis is used ••re to as.lst ia the
~DJerstandiDg of and clarificatioa of ~.latiouship8 b.tween
, ",' ,
;epcndent variable HPD(MW) and a cua••r of iD4epeDdent variahIes.
; . ",.
I: is ~sed in uncoveriu3 apurious re io~ipB aDd for checking
:!,~ effects of intervening variables. A sp\U'io_ rel.tionabip la
lefined in t ....o v/lrillbles, A and B for exa.ple, ill. which A'a co._
~e18tion with B ie 801elr the result of the feet that A v4riea
'''0"lon~ with some other variable, C for exa.ple, which is ~Rdeed the
(!Iv)
true predictor of B. Thia occurs a ll.Ull.ber of ti.es i~ the follow_
~nalrsis is useful in providing
of correlation between the in-
,
Partial correlation
the possible causes
iIlg an81ysis.
'II insight into
1eoendent verillble MPD(HW) and the various independent variables.
. f'...~ _lftfL*
~e correlation and~egression analysis is used bere
:II"dIlly for the purposes of forllulating prediction equatione in res_
pect to p6'1lli>~predictingHPO(M") valuee for anr combination of
values of the independent variables, for determining the degree of
1. linel'dependence of dependent vllriable HPD(HW) on tbe independent
variables operating jointly, for meaeuring the influence of each
independent vsrisbleMPD(Mw), with adjustments made for all independ_
ent variables. Tije last is achieved br tbe uee of standardized V
partial regression coefficients, Beta. The reason why the standard_
ized regression equation Beta is used is because each of the differ_
ent v~ri/lble8 involved, with one exceptio~, is .eaaured in different
units from all the other variable. and it 1s thus difficult to deter~
mine the relative i.portance of eacb iadependen. variable on the vi
basis of the unstandardized partial prgreasioD coefficienta. B aloDe.
J ~ther things being equal. on~ stand~ de.i.tio. unit change in aD
~ independent varillble)for exall Ie (CPI»)would precede a .ini.\1II l
wllge Ilward such the.t the chan in the value of MPV(CPI) would eQu~
the Beta coefficient Illultipl: ed b~ the ~ vlllue of MPV(CPI). \
The multiple coefficient of determinatioa and the Beta coefficieat
are used throughout the hypothesis teatiag. as a basis ot cOIlPsriao,
with the outcome of Pearaon and partial correllltioD aDalrais, sa we~l
~B in the constru.tion and asaess.ent of regression pr.dtctioD~
equa.tion. r'r~l 't. S" /'
-.{~ ...1 I ..M. V- >.J
.. w...u( p«<U<, • ~ A.. <~
~ 7l..~ (,..r'p< ""P!:f":
J
Although the v~ri8bles ere essentially economic in character,
they may be sub-cate~orized. It 1s reasonable. for example, to
classify HPV(~DL) 8S Hn industrial relations v~ri8ble, since it
might be hypothesized that the Full Bench aees ita role 8S one of
s11nteining a atable or strike-free industrial relations cliGete
and. might, therefore, increese the alniaua vage with the inteu-
tion of reducing cause for coaplaint on the part of the unions.
$imilar hypotheses mizht he ~ade about the average waSe and the
lagged mini~~ wage. It might be hypothesized that, if the lagged
minimu. vaze aVArd, or the average vage iucrease wae olearly above
~inflation. t.en the Full Bench, in order t~ protect its credibility
with the employers and the gover~ent would award e below iutla~D
increase. Thus, hy~these. relating to MPD(M~g) aad MPD(AW) .ight
be referred to aa organizational Daiatenance hypotheaes. These
categories are not strict definitions, but they .ay overlap. A
given hypothesis might veIl fit into more than one category. For
e~mple. it might be argued that the hypothesia regarding une.ployment
should be regarded 8S a social velf:re hypothesis. since social prob_
le~ ere caused by unemployment. But unemployment also .eans reduced
consumer spending. which h~8 serious and widespread economic impacts,
such a8 fUrther unemployment. 'l'herefore, uneoployment hns been cate-
..:orized as ;:In econocnic variable.
The statistical analysia in this theais vaa carried out by the
computer programme package, known as the Statistical Package tor The
Social Sciences (SPSS) on the Cyber ?3-28 co.puter iustallstio. of
the University of Melbourne Computer Centre~ SPSS is au integrated
8y8tem of co.~uter programmes. designed for the 8n81Y8is of 800i81
science data/,4- It providee procedures tor data t:unafOr.8tio. and
file manipulation. SPSS proceduree prov4-dea .... larSe number of
statistical procedures. TheSPSS proceduree uaed:".i.:the research tor
rtJ It (,) '11tbis thesie vere Pear80U Corr, ~artial Carr aDd Regres8ioa, aloag_
'1,1
side layout procedures such ss List C..... Th. progreame used i.
atteched to thla: th.ais.
!.!!.TRODUCTICN AND DISC!:!.S.§.ION OF !YE9!.H~~
The =-rsinal p.rcentage differ.nc.
b.tween the ainiana wag. award and
inflation will colncid. with nesative
variations of the -.rglna! percentage
variatioa. in iaflation. In oth.r
words. iacrease. i. 1.flation will
I
coincide with .iai.u. vas. award. with
a oargiaa1 perc.atase inorea•• l ••a
thaA that of ia:f1atioa. j,~
.......,.--
F-il Jjl...~ .-Explanation for Hypoth••i. El.
Hypotheei. E1 is baaed aD the th.ory o~ooet p..h inflation.
Coat pus. inflation is created and .uetaia.d by coet. in produc_
tion, inclUding wage•• th.s. incr.a••• beiag ind.pendent of the
state of deaand. ~e ~oet COD.on .ource of oost pu.h laflatioa
is held to be the pover of trede unlo.. to gala was. increa.e••
which then lead to price increaae., which ia tura .park off further
wllee c]ei.a~~'I)Thi8 conaideration vou1d cause the !'ull Bench, in
ti~ea of high inflation, to lasue .iaiau. wag. incr.a.e•• which
only covered the increase in inflation,' or which .ight even be
below the increaee in inflation. The Benoh ~ight wish to be ••en
aa making a positive contribution to the vel fare of the econo~.
On the other ~nd, whea inflation is low. the Full Bench 8ight
traat aiaiau. wa;e aw~~ds over and above the rate of i.flatio••
thi15 being sa increaee in the r.al wag.. Th. Bench would act wieh
to be aeen refraining·froe ino....l.3 the" a*&a£Lrd\a~~le.tasof
tbe workforce wh.n th.re ia ao over_ridiag re..o. to do .0. ~o
grant increasea i. e~ce.s of iaflatiG. in ti.ee of high t.tlatioa
SAd to ~rant increaaea below or pro-rata with i.tlatioa at ti•••
of lov and in.igaifioant i.flatioa. would be tant..ouat to iaatit-
utioaal suioida. sino. the governaent and ••ploy.e. aay .eek
alternativ.a to the Arbitration Coaa!aaioa t. the firat 1aa~ano.,
and in the aeoond iaatano.. unions aay .ell abandoa the Arbitratioa
Com.i8oion in favour of reaortiag to direot ba rga1aiag With ••ploy-
.ra, which lIight caus. aa incr.aa. in tu In".l of indutriaJ. di_
putation. Such a 1I0V. by the ..ioa...y 1..... the ~lQ.nc. Qf
the Arbitration Co..iaaion ov.r th. iaduatriaJ. ralatio.. are.., of
the induatrial relationa ac••••
which the Co~iaeloa atte~ta to ..intafa oo.tro1. !hue Bypoth••i.
El lIight a180 b. reSarded aa an organizatioaal .ai.t.~ce hypothesia.
aiaee the Comeissioa 8&y ba att.mpting to saintai. ita ability to
fulfill what it posaibly perceives to be ita organizational function,
which ia to maintain industrial har.o~ by way of tight control OYer
/
14,,~/b«::fCJ')' 7l.-r ~~ ,..PD I.J-~
tt:... ...... M........--.. ~~..,f e-,I ~~J·.f..;:;;. ~/" J..r1 -.
?
:=..onoldc. HllO.tI'IlU'li~ .E;!~
~That the .argin&! pera••tage ditferenea
betvee. ~h. aarg~.rc.at.~Tartatio.
'\. b the rW.~Vag.f\...4 tb. aargl:n.a.l p-r-
centago Tariation ta iaflatioe • will Tary
directly with aars1aal porcontage Tarta-
tic.. i. produotiyitJ •• ....ur.d. by
marginal pore••tage Tariatic.. ta th!-Kro"
do•••tl0 roduot. I. othar vor~. tb. ~
aiatau. .ag. award ia aora l1ko17 to oxc••d.
Inflatioa _Jllla tbara are roal. iaere...o. 1&
produotivity aad are .oro l1k_17 to b. 10••
than i.~.tiO. vh•• tbar. are real. daCr•••••
in productlTlty.
~laDatloD ror H7potho.ia 32.
Productivity 115 a f,Po(."", which i. ofto. u•• d. ia .~ua.lllt. about
the Wi8do.~ or otherwi.e of a particular !acro••• ta tho ainlatta
vage, both in minilllUII wage heariage and i.JI. the pree.,7 OJn. produo-
tivity of labour. which ie tbe indepeadeat variable ia thie c••••
ie calculated here by the followiag foraul.a:-
KPV(prodnctivity) = MPV(Qro.s Doae.tic Product)/MPV(AW).
In other worda, HPV productivity ie the ~noti.at of th. aargiaal
percentase variation ia the gross doaestic product the Marginal
percentage variatioa ia the average wage. ~uotie ie other_
wise known aa the iaternal rate of retura can be used
• dO. f
to a:UJeas. iavesHag, fu.ads iato ellployiag .taff .. opposed to hUJ'iag
labour-aaving devices. for ex~ple. It .hoUld be aoted that the
Variable KPV(productivity' ia aot .. accurat. aa i.dlcator of labour
produotivity all can be desired, b.oauae tke Oro•• Doaeetio Produot
aooounte for the output ot aachiaerJ aa well &IS labour.
The reason for suggeetiag that poeiti.e .alUII of KPY(productivity)
O&y iaflnenoll the Full Bench to award abova iaflatioa .iai.ua wage
increases ia, if the u.aioes can poiat to .. iaorea.e ia tb. produc_ /'
tivity of labour. the Full Bench a&7 .ct b. ia • po.itioa to rejeot ~
uaion deaande for ~ above inflatio••1n1a~ wag. ieor..... which
would be indicated by • positi.e val•• of MPD(KW). If the Full
Bench doe. not award a .ini.us wag. i.cr•••• oa th. groued. of an
incr.ase in productivity. th.a it ri.~ 10eta8 credibility with th.
unione by adopting what .ight b. r.garded .... aati-u.ioa !da••
Therefore. eoonoeic hypothesia El aigbt alao be oategori.ed as ..
ergani•• tioDal aaintenano. qypoth••ia.
P..~{ rcC- IN"'-.M ,"",I.,
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~uiz.tio~al H.inte~ce Bypoth.eta O.H,l.
J.jff That the Kargi.al Percentaga Dittere•••
~~ '~. ) betw.e. the aargi..l percentage Yaria-
f.,.......t. ~JJ ".....,r. tio•• 1. the aiD.bua ......g. awarde and t.
~'nflatiO.' will, ta • giT•• year tend to~~ II- -.A-. be aboTe ian.tioll. aad, t. tho foll.viag~ oY.) ,r;-~. h.( _a.rillg, will .....ud ... 1acr.... at or
below the leTel of lallatioa ta the pre-
~.dl.g quarter.
£xpla.stioa of O,M.l.
The .i. of the Full Bench. &••a orgaais.tioa.l ••tit,.. would
~t to enlilure it. 8elt_perpetU&tio.~Ot.order to achie.... tbt_ goal
!t would have to ~ake it••lf •••• neo••eary aad ua.f~. If it were
\0 be seen to b. biased agaill8t the _io.., it woud, _ ... iB.tit-
~tioa. become redundant. The unto.. would the. kaTe reoour•• to
:irtct b"rgainlllg with ••ploy••• , backed up b7 tad_trial. aotioa.
l~ the other hand. if t~e uaioae wis~ to retata t~e co.fidenoe of
e1'I,loyer. and the governme1St, it wou1.d a,.oid an i_ge of beiag
bi~8ed toward8 the unio... It i. thus reaso.able to hypothe.ize
'hat in order to aehie,.e an impression of partiality, the Fu1.1
'linch might render the marginal pereentqe variatiou in its award
alternatively greater than and lesser than the rate of iaflatio.. •
'i._ =-- I-. ~ :r/ ~ar f::J f/.."'"~''';',IG. I'fw-c/T""t/
::;::;=a.- l) ~ . r .."..J~ - tI*J "'"J ...
-u.......,.. W -ere ~ifl... ''''' 'f. '"Crr;anh;ationel Mainteaance H:;rpothe8i8 2';- _ 0.",2. r "'.
~ That if the Margiaa1 Percentage Difference
o! the Average Wage ia the quarter preeedlag the deols10a i8 greater
tba. the ~arglnal percentage ,.ariatio. ia iaflatioa, ...eaaured by
the Consumer Price I.de%. the. the mi.i.~ wage award at that hear_
ing will be leae thaa i.flatioa. If the Harglaa1 Pereeatage Differ-
ence of the average wage i&,les8 than tbe ..rgi_&1 percentage inor•••e
U-t~6 COnsumer Prioe-lnde%, the lIargilla1 ,eronta.p yarf.atioa ia tlle
.edium wage award will be greater thq tke aarpJtal ,eroentag. ta...
crea8e in iaflatioa,
~xplanatio.!!..~O~
Vben conoideriag the effect. of factor. euch .. the Margi..l
Percentage Iacreaae ia Grose Domestic Product, M.P,Y. i_ Co••~er
Price Inde% and H.P.D.(M.W), it can be ..auaed taat the.e ,.ariable.
have a similar i~paet on M.P.D.(A.W.), for the quarter i ..ediate17
preceding that in whieb the ~iDi.ua wage iaereaae ... granted, This
ls because the aTerage wage refleet8 the magnitude and direction of
lncreasea which may ha,.e been granted to particular ocoupatioaal and
ladustry group. at both Federal and State le,.e1., If the ...rginal
percentage ditferenee between the a,.erage wage and ooaauaer price
tadex figure is negative, the Full Bench, in order to gi.e .. ia-
resaion of impartiality. lIIight ~~bove infl"tioD. .iaiau "age
Gereaees to
/con.llluaer price inde:ll:, the Full Baaoh ~ award a .huua vag.
inor••••• sucb that the differ. ca bet•••n the .-rgin&1 percentage
incre.s. ill the 1II1nilllUll .aga bel the .arPaal perc.atap i.cre...
in iaflation 1s aegat!y_. The Full Bench would tr7. thU8, t.
aToid the appearanoa of hi.. i. reTOur of uaioa d.aaaa., OD 0••
hand. and bi.. towards elllplo7era oa t~. other ~._
~.o.!!~~ic .HIpothesh ,. ~. ~(PI:~t tha aargiaal pareantaga'di~a~aDQ.
bat.... tha .iaiaua ••se award wi~ b.
aegati...! wh!n th.ra i •• aargia&1 p.rc.n-
tag. incr.ae. ia ua.aplo~aat and poaiti...!
when th.re ia • aargiaal p!re.nt~. ,.-
Creaa. ia UD.mplo~a.t. In oth.r worda.
an increase in UDeaplo~.nt aight c.~a tba
., vage and salary earnera whlre possible, in order to pre••nt
.bandoll.llllnt or arbitration ill r ••our of pay ~lIIand8 pr•••nt.d
directly to .~ploy.r.t backed up with industrial action. O~
tbe other hand, if tb. Full Bench determine. that tb_ M.P.D.(A.V.)
ia posit!•• , the marginal percentage ~cr•••• in tha •••rag•••g.
being gre.ter than the .argin&! percentage illor.... ia the
,
7Ull Bench to abutaia froa grant tag a aini-
aWl vage incr.alla ""'"....... ~.
Explanation for Hypothellia E.}.
According to cla.sical vage theory. wben real vaga. increase.
'7')the demand for labour can be arpacted to decraa... This t. be-
cause tha marginal increaae in tha profit whioh can ba deri...ed froa
each additional worker is reduced by the .-rginal !Acreas. ia real
wagea. This ia illustrated by tha downvard alopiag d....d CurTe
for labour.
, ~ ' . .-11- "".
")
, pu-wI"" c.1.Ol\Of FOit 1.""""'(
7."""-.EfM "c.lf ~A!QI'f ""'\'l.<")fb
----. --
AD iDcreaae ia raal waga. CaB. therefor., b. erpect.d to lead
to higher UDemplo~eDt. !he hypothaaia ca., th.rafor., b. pOlltulated
that wbe. the ll1argiDal percentage Tariatioa i. uaaployaa.t ta
positt...a. the ~ginal pareantas. incre... i. tk. a!aLlve .a~
'bill nega,u.:sa. This ia baaad Oll tha "'1Iv.&JlUoa that the ..abera of
the Fu1l Bench haTe a .et of aocial. political aDd econoaic ...alue.
such. that the .ini.i~atio. of p~r.onal. .oclal ...d ecoDcaic proble..
posed by UDa~101.eDt i. a desirable obJecti...a.
The second and related ...umptio. follcwi.g trca the fir.t, ia
that the Full Bench regard. the pre.erT_tioa of aaployaeat to ba ...e
higher priority than the increasss i. the real vase, e...e. tbough tha
majority of salary and wage earnera would pre~ar the vag. iacreaa...
" . ,I. ,...:;... ~ I~ >1 ,~U!! ..:.. ....., ....~ _ ,..<U
t'\ vi -< ~i'I. .......
f)< U ~-
1..~0a4 of • reduc.d thre.t of ua••plo,.••t.
Thu. it c~ b. hypoth••i ••d tb.t tho ~l B.nch vill .vard
a aiaiau. v.g. incr••••••uch that tho iacr•••• fa tho ai.iaua
vas••vard.d viII b. Ie•• thaD or .qual to tho iacr.... 1». ia-
fl.t1o.W~ ~~ ~ ;..-rfQ~i·
I~~~al R.l.tio.. Brpath••i. 1. _ I,R,I,
W) ...;d~ [:::t tho _rsiaal perc••t.sa dift.r.ao.
{.L. MfD(1I-l '.b{~t) b.tv... tho at.ia... vaga _d ian.~io.~~ l,J·d<. Mf will directlT urI with tile KPD(XV>. each
'"~ ...-f" , '---- -----l -. ...:.r ~) that the Full B..oll vill ••Aiir .bo.,.. i_
""""""1"' . flatioa inor••••• b rupou. to &II. ia-
cr..... ia iad_trial 41aptt•••
~~t~?~ for Htpotheai. I.R.1.
One ot tho ao.t proaiaent f_otio.. of th. Co......alth
Coneiliatioa and Arbitratioa Co..i ••ioa i. tho aaiat.aaac. of
induatrial pe.co. !hi. 111."'01.,.•••iai.i_las tho
ae.,.erity of i.du.trial di.pute...4 .toppage••
industrial dispute. h• .,.e b.e. b.... oa 4....4&
hcid.ac...d
61.,.•• th.t~
for laen•••4
vag••• it vould be r ••son.ble to hypoth••i •• that, h • ahiaua
wage heari.g rolloviag a pariod of relati"'.17 bigb iaduatri&1
unreaat, ~ea.ured ia ter.. of workiag d.7. lo.t. troD tho data
the preTious natioaal ainiau. waga iacr•••• bac..a atf.cti.,.••
the Full Bench of the Coneiliatio. and Arbitratio. Co..i ••ioa
would be prepared to ba aora ga.eroue. CO.Tar••17. followiag
periods of lov indu.trial unreat. the ~ll B.noh aight veIl aot
make an above-inflation miDlmua vage avard.
This situatioR alao ha. org.ai••tional ••i.teD&aC. iapli-.
catioDa. If th.re is a p.riod of iaduatrial .-r.at o.,.er w.g•••
it could b. iadic.tiT. of • aubstantial g.p b.t•••• tho r.t. ot
vag. i.cr•••• and th. rat. of pric. iacr..... cauaiag .. ero._
io. of tho .tandard of li.,.iag. This ooul••ti-.lat... hcr••••
in iDdustrial uar••t. Strike .ctio. ~ _11 b. u.d b7 the
Wl.iou .... alteraath·. to tho arbitr.tioa .,..t••, if. ia tho
opiaio. ot the UJli01l.&. the bcr.a.e. a_rd.d b7 0•• or a.ab.r.
of tho Co.cili.tic. and Arbitratioa Co_i••ioa u-. u.,d.q_t••
Iaadequate vage i.cr.a.e. aight c.... tho Arbitratioa Coaai&ica
to b. by-pa•••d. witk the COBe.queace that tho role ot ...d ••ed
for the Co..i ••io. aigkt be aerio..1y que.tio.ed.
".
Political Hypothesis 1. _ P.l.
That the Full Bench is more likely to award
a marginal percentage wage increase above
the marginal percentage increase in inflation
when a party sympathetic to the labour move-
ment, such as the Australian Labour Party, is
in governcent, than when a pro-ecployer and
anti-union party, such as the National Liberall
and/or National Country Party, is in government.
Exnlanation for Political Hypothesis 1. _ P.l.
A Labour Government is likely to apply pressure to the Arbit-
ration Commission to award an increase in real wages. This is
because the philosophy and inclination of the Labour Party policy
supports real wage increases and impYovements in the quality of
life and standard of living of wage and salary earners. In addition~
there is a close relationship between the union movement and the
Australian Labour Party, with trade union members present in the
policy making bodie_, the state and federal execu~'ves, ss well as
4b..rin the federal Parliamentary Labour Party. In a our government,
it would be highly probable that Ministers concerned with industrial
relations would be former union officials, who have had experience
in negotiating for wage increases with the Full Bench and with
employers.
On the other hand, conservative parties, such as the Liberal
Party, traditionall~have a large number of members who are not 1
wage and salary earners. Rather, they are mainly entrepreneurs v
"themselves, or descendents of successful entrepreneurs, who haV\
independent means. The interests of wage earners and the interests
of ~trepreneur6 are somewhat opposed, in that the wage earner~
wage increase is the entrepreneur$ loss. This loss can be recouped
by increasing prices, but either direct union action or an arbit-
tration commission determination will pass the costs back to the
entrepreneur. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that when a right
wing political party is in office, the marginal percentage increas~
in the m1nimum wage will tend to be less than the marginal per-
centage increase in inflation.
COmmission and resort to direct bargaining.
That there is a negative correlation between the independent
r
~ p-A... variable M.P.D(M.W.18g) and dependent variable M.P.D(M.W).
~ ~ In other words, a positive value of H.P.D(M.W) will coincide with
~. )\ a negative value of M.P.D(M.W.lag) and a negative value of M.P.D
(M.W) will coincide w'lh a positive value of M.P.D.(M.W.lag).
Thus if the full Bench will attempt to abstain from awarding,
in successive hearings, minimum wages increases ~hat are constantly
,.-<v..A-I1above inflation, or minim~m wage increa~~~~belOw nflation. If the
full Bench consistently awards above inflation increases it might
be seen as being biased towards the unions thus inviting attack
from employers and government. If minimum wage increases are
constantly below inflation, the unions would by-pass the Arbitration
So in order to protect
-efits role, the full Bench of the Commission will attempt to~
minimum wage increases which are alternately above and below
inflation.
Observation: Period 1 1956-1976 including wage indexation.
The Pearson correlation coefficient between independent variable
M.P.D.(M.W.l8g) and M.P.D.(H.W) is - .0149. Although the negative
~~ of the coefficient supports hypothesis O.M.I, the
magnitude of the coefficient indicates that there is virtually no
relationship between M.P.D.(M.W) and M.P.D (M.W.lag) _ Thus, on
the basis of the Pearson correlation coefficient, hypothesis O.H.I
is refuted due to the l8Ck of any substantive relationship between
the dependent and independent variables.
Hypothesis OM_I Period 1 Observations and Conclusions.
The partial correlation coefficients indicate, as does the Pearson
correl8tion coefficient, that there is no substantial re18tionship
between independent variable M.P.D.(M.W.lag) and de~endent variable
rU"r:~ ((l>-h-.{!~ ~? )
M.P.D.(H.W). The~correlation coefficientsAfor the vari8bles
M.P.V.(C.P.1), M.P.D.(A.W.), M.P.V. (unemployment) M.P.V.(working
days lost), and M.P.V (productivity) are respectively - .0627,
-.0379. _ .0171. -.0150. and - .0138.
,7 The partial correlation coefficientAobtained when controllingfor all the exogenous independent variables 15 .1344. the positive
polarity of which refutes hypothesis O.M. in period one.
Adding MPD.(MW1ag) to the regression equation for period one induces
an increment to the coefficient of determination of .01405,
indicating that variations in KoP.D.CHoW.lag) account for 1.4 per
cent of all variations in the dependent variable MPO(M.W). The
beta value for M.P.D.CH.W.lag) in period one 1s _ .1252458.
indicating that an increase in one unit in MPD(KWlag) induces a
decrease of -_1252458 in the dependent variable MPO(KW). thus
confl~n9 the hypothesis O.M.I. which postulates that an increase
-
in MPD(MWlsg) induces a decrease to a negative value of dependent
~varlable MPO(MW). Thus an above inflation minimum wage award
in one year will have a very small influence in causing a below
inflation minimUll'l wage increase in the following year. The
magnitudes of the Pearson and partial correlation coefficients
indicate that any such causality to be extremely slight. It could,
for all practical purposes, assumed to be nil.
Conclusion: Hypothesis O.M.I Period 1 1956-1976 (including wage
indexation>.
The hypothesis O.M.I is refuted because of the lack of any
substantial correlation between KJP.D.(M.W.lag) and M.P.O (M.W),
the independent variable. Thus, on the basis of the foregoing
observations, it can be said that the Full Bench of the COanonwealth
Concilliations and Arbitration COmmission does not consciously
attempt to vary the minimum wage increases so that they are
alternatively above and below inflation.
/
wage1976 (exclUding
1>
•
indexation) •
Hypothesis O.M.I Period 2 1956 - February
t.:.{I..t..-. eJU ~...s
Observations, ~
As is the Case when wa9~ndeXat10n cases are included the Pear~on •
correlation coefficient is well belO~ bein~_ 0459, indicating
that there is no substantial relationsbib ~~twe~dependent
?7
~>I' .
D. ,. DIU) -O'04~'f :>,
variable H.P.D.U!.W.18g)
AI tltel:lgb ~m1nating the
and dependent variable M.~.(M.W).
data pertaining to those cases in which
wage indexation applied has AfII'the effect of increasing slightly
the magnitude of the Pearson and Partial correlation coefflcients~
1rcontrolling for the variables M.P.v-iunemployment), M.P.V (W.D.L)
and M.P.V.(productivity), singly and in paired COmbinat10n~ ,,:;...t,J
correlation coefficients with magnitudes of less than .1000, thus
indicating that hypothesis O.M.I is, for period 2, refuted due to
lack of substantial relationships between the dependent and
independent variable. Although controlling for the effects of both
M.P.D.(A.W.) and MPV (productivity) together, increases the
~Of the partial correlation coefficient to a maximum of
0.. _~"
- 2415, • hich indicates a confirmation of hypothesis O.M.I,
nevertheless, due to the fact that the magnitude of the Pearson
correlation coefficient and a number of the partial correlation
coefficients falls below .1000, hypothesis O.M.I is regarded as \
tr,refuted. ~"'PD(MWlj)~t-t/JT)(I<W.
c:J.,J ~ ~e partiel correlation coefficientAach1eved by controlling for
.r l·.ff;/ ~ ~ 3+t<\- '?1~1'; ,~(all the;tvariebles is -3484, which is similar to the partial
~J ~ correlation coefficients and is also the maximum observed magnitude
achieved. This provides some confirmation of the hypothesis O.H.I,
however, despite this, the pearson and some of the partial correlation
have magnitudes below .1000, which s~s to
o~ny substantial relatignship.
indicate~the non-existence
-;/tr
Adding M.P.D.(M.W.lag) to the regression equatio for period 2
increments the coefficient of dete~nt1on by .04673 indiceting
that changes in M.P.D.(M.W.lag) explain four percent of the changes
occurring in dependent variable M.P.D.(M.W.). The Beta coefficient
for M.P.D.(M.W.lag) in ~~dd 2 is - .2414791, which indicates that
Cl-d M.
an increase of one unit of M.P.D.(H.W.lag) is likely to bring about
rwtlw
a decrease of .2415 units in the dependent variable H.P.C.(H.W.lag),
which 1s consistent with, and is a confirmation of, hypothesis O.M.I,
which postulates that a positive value of H.P.C.(M.W.lag) will
~oincide with a neaative value of H.P.D.(H.W).
The reason for the discrepancy between the fact that the Pearson
correlation coefficient, of - a0459. indicates no relationship,
whilst the Beta coefficient indicates a relationship is that the
beta coefficient and coefficient of determination are based on the
_ correlation coefficient produced by controlling for all exogenous
variables. which in this case is 3483 { ...~!~ .~.,J -~ .. ,2.~/4-
(. .... (K~v. r-J.
It can be concluded that eliminating the data associated with
minimum wage increases awarded under
/~aises the magnitudes of the pearson
coefficients, but despite this, there
the wage indexation guidelines
and partial correlation
are six observed partial
oorrelation coefficients of less than a1000, in which three occur
when controlling for single variables, and three occur when
controlling for two variables togethera This, coupled with the
fact that the Pearson correlation coefficient is less than a1000
in absolute magnitUde, is sufficient grounds to consider that for
period two, hypothesis OaM.I is refuted, despite indications to
the contrary by bhe beta coefficienta
Hypothesis a.Ma! Period 3 Wage Indexation 1975-19__
. ..,
Observations: fc I'" . ?
V",L..t.. .
The negati~ polarity of the Pearson correlation coefficient indicate!
that it supports hypothesis OaM.I, which postulates that positive
values of the independent variable, M.P.O.(M.W.lag) will coincide
with negative values of M.PaO.(M.W). However, the magnitude of
the correlation coefficient of _ a1354 indicates that the
relationship between the dependent and independent variable is slighta
The magnitude of the partial correlation coefficients range from
-a0089 when controlling for M.P.Va(WaO.La) to e maximum of -aB357
when controlling for both HaP.V.(C.PaI.) and M.PaVa(unemployment)
t.ogether.
The reason for the magnitude of the partial correlation coefficient
when controlling for MaP.V.'W.~L) is the fact that both the
pearson correlation coefficients between the dependent variable
M.P.D.(M.W) and MaPaV.'W.~L), of .1770 and between the independent
variablJj;MaPaO.(MaW.lag.) and MaP.O.(WaD.L.), of -a7312, are both
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greater than the Pearson correlation coefficient between
M.P.D.{M.W.) and MoP.D.(H.W.lag) of -.1354. Therefore it can
be said that M.P.D.(M.W.lag) varies with the dependent variable
H.P.D.(H.W) mainly because both the dependent variable
MoPoDo(M.vi and the independent variable MoP.D.(H.W.lag) both
vary with M.P.D.C.W.D.L). This renders the hypothesis 0.M.1
spurious. This is despite the fact that it could be argued that
M.P.I.(W~.L) could be regarded as an intervening variable. This
1
1s because, ~ at, although it is a widely held opinion that strikes
are mainly based on pay demands, and hence. wage increases are based
on strikes, the correlation in Period 3 (1975-1976 wage indexation)
is that a post tive value of H.P. V. (W.~L.) coincides with negative
values of H.P.Do(HoW). Therefore, since in Period 3 the role of
~.V(W.D.L) as an intervening variable between H.PoDo (HoW) and
M.P.D.(H.W)lag:is debatable. M.P.D.(W.D.tl has been controlled for
in this instance.
(Another notable effect is that when controlling for H.P.V.(C.P.I).
lwhich produces a partial correlation coefficient of - .0746. It
could be argued that inflation is surely an intervening variableD: !)?
in the relationship between the M.P. V. (H.W.lag) and M.P 0 V. (M.Wo )
, "'t!"
However, M.P •• (H.W.lag) correlates with MoP.V.(C.Po1) with a
coefficient of - .4481, the negative pOlarity of which contradicts
the expectation that a positive value of M.Po).(M.W.lag) will
coincide with a positive value of MoP.V.(C.P.t). Instead. of
inflation increasing following an above inflation minimum wage
increase. inflation decreases following above inflation minimum
wage increase. However, the correlation coefficient between
MoP.Vo(C.P.t) and the dependent variable M .,!.Mo'W.~t550,
being~i~n pOI~rity. indicates that an above inflation
wage increase coincides with an increase in inflation. although
the magnitude of the correlation coefficient is small, indicating
that the coincidence 1s slight.
,
Since M.P.V.(C.P.I) does not behave as it would be expected to
were it an intervening variable, it is doubtful whether it can
properly be regarded as such. Since, however, M.P.V.(C.P.I) is
the basis of wage indexation, on which the Pull Bench bases its
decision as to the magnitude of the minimum wage award,
it can be argued that M.P.V.(C.P.I) can be regarded as an
intervening variable. Since the position is thus anomalous one,
the effects of controlling for M.P.V.(C.P.I) will be disregarded.
The controlling for both M.P.V.(C.P.I) and M.P.V.(unemployment)
produces a partial correlation coefficient with negative pOlarity
and a magnitude of -.8357, which, in itself, might be seen as a
,
strong confirmation of hypothesis 0.M.1. The characterist4CS
of this partial correlation coefficient are due to the fact that
independent variable M.P.V.(H.W.lag} may have a causitive
relationship with both M.P.V.(C.P.I), with a correlation coefficient
of -.4481, and with M.P.V. (unemployment) with a correlation
coefficient of .5820. The relationship might be described as
causative since, in each case, the data of H.P.D.(H.W.lag) predates
that of M.P.V.(C.P.I) and H.P.V. (unemployment). The correlation
coefficien~indicate that an above inflation minimum wage awarded
in the previous national wage case hearing predates anmarginal
decrease in inflation and a rise 1n unemployment, both of which
together, might slightly tend to predate a minimum wage award below
inflation. In addition, M.P.V. (unemployment) correlates with
M.P.V.(C.P.I) with a coefficient of .4157 indicating and confirming
that any marginal decrease in inflation following an above
inflation minimum wage increase would coincide with a marginal
percentage increase in unemployment, following the same above
inflation minimum wage award. The dependent variable M.P.D.(M.W)
correlates with M.p.v.(e.p.I), very slightly, indicated by a
correlation coefficient of .1550, and with M.P.V.(unemployment)
with a pearson correlation coefficient of .2480, thus completing
the indirect correlation between the dependent variable
M.P.D(M.W) and independent variable M.P.D.(H.W.lag).
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Thus. it can be seen that o!I time sequence is Involved, wi th three
stages first. there is the lagged minimum wage award, which
predates marginal percentage variations In both unemployment and
inflation, which both, in turn, predate the current minimum wage
award. Therefore, it Can be said that In period three both
M.p.V.Ce.p.I) and H.P.V.(unemploymentl, together, are intervening
variables, and therefore the correlation coefficient thus achieved,
- .8357, is logically invalid. This, then, would also be the case
with controlling for H.P.V.(C.P.I) alone which might clarify the
previously observed situation.
Adding H.P.D.CH.W.lag) to the regression equation for period
three Incre::aents the coefficient of determination by .0245. wMch
indicates that 2.45 percent of the variation in the dependent
variable H.P.D.CH.W} coincides with variations in the independent
variable M.P.D. (M.W.lag). The beta coefficient for independent
variable MPD(MWlag) for period three is -.17645, which indicates
9<lM
that a degrease in dependent variable H.P.D.(M.W.) of .17645 units
thl tIt.J.
coincides with an increase of one unit in the independent variable
M.P.D.CH.W.lag), and that an increase in dependent variable
H.P.D.(H.W) coincides with a decrease in the independent variable
H.P.D.CH.W.lag) of one unit. This is in line with the relationship
postulated by hypethesis O.H.l, and supported by the Pearson
correlation coefficient.
Hypothesis O.M.l Period 3.
Conclusions: :f ......( ~"
It ci!ln therefore be concluded that, 4Jn~the consideration of
spuriousness aside, the Pearson and partial correlation coefficients
tend to confirm hypothesis O.M.l, namely that above inflation
and below inflation minimum wage awards will occur in alternate
years. However, if the effect of controlling for M.P.V.(W.D.L) is
considered, then hypothesis O.H.l might be regarded as postulating
a spU~lous relationship. Furthermore it can be said that although
- 8 -
some partial correlations, such as that achieved when controlling
for M.P.V.(C.P.1) and MoP.V. (unemployment), offer strong support
and confirmation to hypothesis 0.M.1. However, these partial
correlations should perhaps be disregarded, sin~e the variables
controlled for, it can be argued, are intervening variables, 1n
that they provide an intermediate interaction between the dependent
and independent variables.
Since relationships between M.P.D.(M.W.lag) and M.P.D.(M.W.)
involve sequenced, rather than coinciding, variables, it might be
debated that all variables controlled for may be, to som~tent,
intervening. Therefore, all observations. for hypothesis O.M.l
period 3, based on partial correlation coefficients should be
regarded with caution.
Therefore, on the basis of the characteristics of the Pearson
correlation coefficient, between H.P.D.(M.W.} end H.P.W.lag), it
can be concluded that hypothesis 0.M.1 is very slightly confirmed,
or, on the basis of controlling for M.P.W.{W.P.C) the hypothesis
0.M.1 postulates a spurious hypothesis.
Organizational Maintenance Hypothesis O.M.2.
If the value of M.P.D.(.A.W.) is positive, then the value
of the dependent variable M.P.D.(M.W.) will be negative.
If the full bench perceives that, in relation to the
~ ~
quarter precedin~case 'V-I, there has been an above
inflation increase in the average wage, the full Bench will be
increase in the minimum
- ... II
[,.I, 4"''''''' (,Jr. ..,t.~.,..... '" 'W? /~.o
Period 1.
likely to award a below inflation
wage.
Observations .~ "-
The magnitude of the-Partial Correlation coefficie~ is
.~302 which, being positive, refutes hypothesis O.M.2 and
indicates confirmation of the antithesis, namely, that an
above inflation increase in the average wage in the quarter
preceding the minimum wage award is likely to precede an
~ ... 0:0-. t"Jd r__--rV- -..:J...J k.t
above inflation minimum wage award. f::id'«.t---< k-~ ~I (.<ira-!
/£{.f.~ :
The magnitudes of the partial corre1ation coefficients
vary from a minimum of .1369 whe'n controlling for both
M.P.V.(C.P.I) and M.P.V.(unemployment) together, to a
maximum observed value of .3534 when controlling for M.P.D
7'
(M.W.lag) ~D.~.~. However, controlling for
M.P.O.(H.W.lag), singly or in combin~tion with other variabl~
is of douhtful validity, since M.P.O.(H.W.lag) could be ~
considered to playa major role in determining the magnitude
of M.P.D.(A.W.) due to the nature of the chronological
relationship between these two variables. The probable
reaaon for the low magnitude of the partial correlation
coefficient achieved when controlling for H.P.V. (unemployment)
and H.p.V(e.p.I) is that both the dependent and independent
variables, M.P.D.(M.W.) and M.P.D.(A.W.) respectively, are
both correlated with the variable pair M.P.V.(unemployment)
and M.P.V.(W.D.l). Th& correlation coefficient between
H.P.W.(W.O.l) and M.P.O. (unemployment) ie -.4389, Since
this is greater in absolute magnitude than the Pearaon
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correlation coefficient of .3302. it might be said that to
a certain extent, independent variable H.P.O.(A.W.) varies
with dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W.) because M.P.D.(.A.W.)
varies with M.P.V.(W.D.L.) with a correlation coefficient
of -.2057. and dependent variable H.P.D.(M.W.) variea with
H.P.V. (unemployment) with a correlation coefficient of
-.2046. The link Is co~pleted by the correletion coefficient
between H.P.V. (unemployment) and M.P.V.(W.D.l) of -.4389.
The net effect of this parallel relationship is to boost
the strength of the relationship between the independent
variable Hf·P .(A.W.) and the dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W.).
Controlling for the effects of these variables thus
e~iminates a structure which contributes to some of the
strength to the relationship between the deperideot arid
indepeneent variables.
The effects of eliminating this structure of correlation
relationships is to reduce the magnitude of the correlation
coefficient to .1369. It could thus be argued that the
relationship hypothesized by hypothesis OM2 _ay be somewhat
spurious.
The partial correlation coefficient achieved by controlling
for sll the exogenous variables is .3499, which is very
similsr in magnitude to the Pearson correlation coefficient
and to mc·.t of the partial correlation woefficients achieved
by controlling for one and for two variables. Thus the
relatively low correlation coefficient achieved by
controlling for both M.P.D.(W.D.l)
is unique to this combination.
Including the independent varlabl
and M.P.O. (unemployment)
"'"Pb ,'",I..,A >-~ ')
",,}
M.P.O. in the regression
equation for period one increments the coefficient of
determination by .10905. which indicates that increases in
- 37 -
in H.P.D.(.A.W) induce ten per cent of increases in the t
dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W.) and ten percent of decreases
in HP.D.(H.W.) are induced by decreases in the independent
variable H.P.D.0:-=?~),r.../.J( '?
I
i
The Beta coefficient for independent variable H.P.D.(A.W.)
is .1443, indicating that a variation in M.P.D.(.A.W.) of one
~,D j,'j)
~ induces a variation in the same direction of ~1443 ~
in the dependent variable H.P.D.(H,W.). r
The foregoing Buggests that hypothesis OM2 is refuted and
at
inflation increases in the average wage precede the above
inflation minimum wage awards, rather than below inflation
its antithesis is confirmed. It is probable that aboye
/
,
i
I
I
minimum wage awards 8S postulated in hypothesis 0"2.
Organizational Maintenance Hypothesis QH2 - Period 2
Observations and Conclusions.
The Pearson correlation coefficient is .5379, indicating
refutation of hypothesis OM2 and confirmation of the
antithesis of hypothesis OMZ, namely, that positive values
of independent variable M.P.O.(A.W.) precede positive values
of dependent variable M.P.D.(M.W.), negative values of which
are preceded by negative values of H.P.D.(A.W.). In other
/
This is similar to the situation for period one, with an
increase in the magnitude of the correlation coefficient,
words, above-inflation increases observed in the average
~"'D
wage ~ precede above inflation minimu. wage awards by the
inherent in eliminating the data for the minimum wage awards.-'--~
which might be due to the decrease in the number of cases
Full Bench, and below inflation increasee in the average
~"\
wage ~-t precede below inflation mini_UII wage awards.
I
~ttl{ ". . _ .
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This is also the case with the partial correlation
coefficients, the minimuN observed value of which is .3880,
-----produced by controlling for both~P.D.(C.P.I) and M.P.O.
(unemployment),together. This is due to the chain" of
correlation coefficients, such that the independent
variable H.P.D.(A.W.) varies directly with H.p.V.ce.p.l),
with a correlation coefficient of .~924. which in turn
varies directly with dependent variable H.P.D.C.H.W.) with
a coefficient of .2511. Thus M.p.V.ce.p.I.) contributes
substantially to the strength of the correlation between
independent variable H.P.D.(A.W.) end independent variable
H.P.D.CM •• W}. Controlling for H'P'l.Ce.p.I) has the effect
~ !:rl&-<- t.J V ~ ....,~.
of reducing the strength of the relationship between
above inflation minimum wage awards does not imply sny
wage increaaes swarded, including previous minimum wage
increases, and increases granted to individual occupational
The average wage is determined byrelationship.
M.f.D.(A.W.) and dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W.). The oblt:i'vo~I(AfI
that above inflation average wage increases precede
casual•
,
,
1
groups by the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration
Commission as well as by State Wage DeterMination Boards, and
increasea negotiated by direct bargaining. Therefore it could
be said thst the overall inflationary situation might generate
a tendency for most wage increases to either be above or
below inflation at any given time, snd therefore controlling
for H.P.V.(C.P.I) removes the co••onality link between the
average wage snd the minimum wage awards granted by the
Full Bench and the fact that they react in a similar manner
to changea in inflation.
Adding the independent variable H.P~D.(A.W.) to the regression
equation for period two increments the coefficient of
determination by .28936 indicating that 28 per cent of sll J
varialions in the dependent variable M.P.D.{M.W.)
coincide with variations in the independent variable
M.P.D.(A.W.) The Beta coefficient for M.P.D.(A.W.) in
period 2 is .6601146, indicating that a variation of
.6601146 units in the dependent variable M.P.D.(M.W.)
coincides with a variation of one unit in the independent
variable M.P.D.(A.W.). The results of these observations
are in line with the result for the Pearson and partial
correlation coefficients, and indicate that hypothesis
DM2 is refuted end its antithesis is confirmed. Above
inflation increases in the minimum wage award are likely
to coincide with above inflation movements in the average
wage, although ~_~o causal relationship.:
Organizational Maintenance Hypothesis OM2 - Period 3
Observations and Conclusions.
The Pearson Correlation coefficient is .0801" which
indicates that there is Virtually no relationship between
the dependent variable M.P.D.(M.W.) and the independent
variable M.P.D.(A.W.). Out of the six partial correlations
obtained by controlling for exogenous variables singly,
only one, obtained by controlling for H.P.V.(productivity),
is indicative of any relationship between the independent
and dependent variables. Controlling for all the other
exogenous variables individually produces partial
correlation coefficients with absolute magnitudes less than
.1000.
Controlling for M.P.V.(productivity) produces the highly
deviant correlation coefficient of .6211, which contrasts
stringly with the other partial correlation coefficients.
-lr >$r<~1 .
srr 7
< "'sh,lC''''1 11 .
,
The probable reason for th1s 1s that the only
relationship occurring between the dependent variable
M.P.D.(M.W.) and the independent variable H.P.D.{A."".)
1s baaed on the fact that both are strongly related to
H.P. V.(productivity). The dependent variable
H.P.D.(H.W.) varies with H.P.V.(producUvity) with.
correlation of -.6614, whilst the independent v8r~able
H.P.D.(A.III.) variee with H.P.V.(productivity) with.
correlation coefficient of .0\921. It .ight be argued
that the relationship between the dependent and independent
variable mey be spurious.
Adding the independent variable H.P.D.(A."".) to the
regression equation for period 3 has the effect of
loera.enling the coefficient of determination by .04868,
which indicates that 4.868 per cent of the variation in the
dependent variable N.P.D.(N.N.) coincide with the variations
in the independent varieble H.P.D.(A.W.). The Beta
coefficient of the independent variable for period three is
.6274616 indicating that a direct variation of .6274616
units in the dependent varieble H.P.D.(H.W.) will coincide
with a variation of one unit in the independent variable
t
"
M.P.D.(A.W.). This is consistent with the partial
J
correlation coefficient obtained by controlling for
H.P.V.(productivity), .6217, but is inconaistent with the
Pearson correlation coefficient and .ost of the Partial
correlation coefficients.
It can be concluded that for period three, hypothesis
DM2 is refuted, due to the lack of any aubatantial
relationship between the dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W.)
and the independent variable H.P.D.(A.W), with the exception
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of that indicated by the relationahip obtained by
controlling for M.P.V.(productivity), which refutes
hypothesis OMI and supports the antitheaia, in that
the polarity of the correlation coefficient of .6217
indicates that above inflation net increases in,
rather than below inflation increaaes, in the average
wage will precede above inflation increasee in the
minimum wage granted by the rull Bench.
· " ,.. -"'/ 100
Hypothesis I.R.I. (Industrial Relations I )
That positive values of M.P.V.(W.D.l) coincide with positive
values of the dependent variable M.P.D.(M.W), and negative
values of M.P.V(W.D.L) coincide with negative values of
M.P.D(M.W). A7ginal percentage 1ncrease 1n M.P.v(w.D.L)l7?
ShO,"d COin~e with mac{,nal peccentage i;;;ce~n the .
d4':ndenp.(;;able M.P./D.(M.W). This hypothes1s is based on .
the assumption that if the members of the Full Bench of the
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission perceive that, since
the last increase awarded in the minimum wage, there has been
a substantial increase in industrial unrest over pay claims,
the full bench will grant an above inflation minimum wage
increase, in order to restore industrial harmony.
~It should be noted that, since observations are based on the
periods between minimum wage increases, rather than on the
number of working days lost in the quarter immediately preced-
ing the minimum wage variation awarded at a National Wage
Case, the magnitude of changes in the number of working days
lost will be affected by the length of the interval between
national wage cases~;the assumption is made that the Full Bench
will take the length of the interval between National Wage
cases into consideration when considering -the incidence of
industrial unrest as manifested in strikes.
Observations: 1955 to November 1976 including wage indexation
period.
(Period 1)
The Pearson correlation coefficient is .07621 which indicates
that there is no significant relationship between the dependent
variable M.P.D.(M.W) and the independent variable M.P.V.(W.D.l),
and, , on this basis, hypothesis IRl is refuted. Analysis of
the partial correlation coefficients reveals that they range
in magnitude from -.0291, when controlling for MPV(unemployment),
to a maximum of .1453 when controlling for the effects of
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H.P.O(H.W.lag). Since there are no less than Bsven partial
correlation coefficients les8 than .1000 in magnitude, as is
the cass with the Pearson correlation coefficient, it can be
concluded that hypothesis I.R.! is refuted. When all the
independent variables spart fr H.P.V. (W.P.l) are controlled
for, the partial correlation coefficient Is .0334664,
which confirms this conclusion.
~ -eAfH( .::...!Ct .". 2Th8~coefficient of determinstion,R is .00112, indicating
that .00112 per cent of the variations in the value of the
dependent variable H.P.DCH.W) is explained by the variable
HPV(W.D.l). In the regression equation for period 1 the
Bets value for HPV(WOl) is .423769, indicating that an
increase of one unit in H.P.V.(W.D.l} will cause an increase
of the .agnitude of .0423769 units in the dependent variable
H.P.D.(N.D.l}. Thus it can be concluded on the basis of these
results, that, in the period 1956 to the end of 1976, the
full Bench did not place much weight on the incidence of
industrial unrest when considering the minimum wage increases
awarded • .t~(Ob ')...~
Observations: 1956 to Msrch 1975, excluding wage indexation.
The Pearson correlation coefficient is .0888 in magnitude,
from which fact it can be deduced that hypothesis I.R.l is
refuted due to the absence of any substantial relationship
between the independent variable H.P.V.(W.D.l) and the
dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W}.
The partial correlation coefficients range in magnitude from
.0877 when eliMinating the effects of H.P.D.(H.W.leg}, to
.4555, when controlling for the effects of both H.P.D.(A.W)
and H.P.V.(productivity} together. The partial correlation
coefficient achieved when controlling for all other
independent variables is .0209117. These partial correlation
coefficients provide indic.tions ranging from hypothesis I.R.l
being refuted to slight confirmstion for hypothesis I.R.l
Controlling for both M.P.D.(A.W) and H.P.V.(productivity)
together produces a psrtial correlation coefficient of
.4555 because of the effects of the relationship between
indepeodent variable M.P.V(W.D.l) and H.P.D.(A.W) es
manifested by s Pssrson correlation coefficient of -.3363,
and because of a relationship b.tween H.P.V.(W.D.L) and the
dependent vsrisble H.P.D.(M.W.) as indicated by a Pearson
correlation coefficient of .5379. This means that the fact
thata substantisl relationship between the dependent and
independent variables is absent is due, to so~e extent, to
the relationship between M.P.D.(A.W.) and the independent
variable M.P.V.(W.D.L), and alao to the relationship between
dgpendent variable H.P.O.(M.W) and M.P.V.{productivity1.
Thus the coincidience of negative values of M.P.D.{W.D.L) with
positive values of M.P.D.(A.W.), and the coincidence of
positive values of M.P.D.(.A.W.) with the dependent variable
H.P.D.(M.W.) causes the Pearson correlation coefficient to be
reduced to .0888. Therefore controlling for both M.P.D.(A.W)
and H.P.V (productivity), together, increases the magnitude
of the correlation coefficient between independent variable
M.P.V.(W.D.L) and dependent variable H.P.D.(M.W) to .4445.
The absolute increment of the coefficient of determination,
due to the addition of MPV(W.D.L) to the regression equation
fOf Period 2, ia .08878 indicating that onlyo.8878 per cent
of the variation in the dependent variable M.P.D.(H.W) ia
explained by variations in M.P.V.(W.D.L.). In the same
regression equation, the beta coefficient is .1315420,
indie'ting that a variation of one unit of M.P.V(W.D.L.) will
cause a variation of .1315420 units in the dependent variable
M.P.D.(M.W.). These results indicate that although the
attention given by the full bench to the incidance of strikea
when considering variations in the minimum wage in period 2
is miniscule, it is still slightly more than that paid to
the incidence of strikes 1n period I, which incorporates the
wage indexation period. However, it is possible that this
effect may be due to the reduction from 21 esses in period 1
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to 1~ cases in period 2.
It can therefore be concluded that, for period 2, hypothesis
I.R.l Is refuted due to en apparent absence of consideration
for the incidence of industrial unrest by the full Bench of
the Conciliation and Arbitration Commiasion in the course
of National Wage Case hearings.
,
~H~y~p~o~t~h~.:.~i:.~I~.~R~.~I~O~b~.~.~r~y~.~t~i~o~n~s~P~.::.or=i~o~d-"3~1~'~5~'..-.. Harch 1975.
Dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W.) Independent variable
H.P.I(W.D.L.).
~he Pearson correlation Is -.7312, which strongly refutes
C ,.,. \.• hypothesis I-R and confirms its inverse, namely, that
the full bench would respond to 8 positive value of
H.P.I(W.D.L) with 8 negative value of H.P.D.(H.W), which
'-
strongly contradicts the hypothesis I.RI. It might therefore
be said that the postulated relationship ~ay be considered
spurious, if the resulta of controlling for both H.P.V
(productivity) and H.P.O.(.A.W.) are considered.
The refutation of hypothesis I.R.I for period three ia
borne out by the Beta coefficient of the independent variable
H.P.V.(W.D.L) of - .4'92240 which indicates that a vsriation
in dependent variable H.P.O.(H.W.) of a given polarity, and
of .439224 units in magnitude,
of one unit in the independent
will coincide with a variation
9' of
variable ~ the opposite
polarity. This contradicts hypothesis I.R.l which postulates
that p.ositive vslues of M.P.V.(W.D.L) will tend to coincide
with sn above inflation minimum wage award, and negative
values of M.P.O.(W.D.L.) coincides with below inflation
minimum wage awards. The antitheais is thus cDnfirmed,
in which positive values of H.P.V.(W.O.L) coincide with
below inflstion increases and vice versa.
Adding H.P.V.(W.D.L) to the regression equation for period
three increments the coefficient of determination by .53462
- 13
which indicates that variations in independent variable
M.P.Y.(M.D.L) coincide with 53.462 per cent of the
variations of dependent variable H.P.O.(H.W), which indicates
the high relative strength of the inverse relationship
between M.P.D.(HW) and H.P.Y(W.D.L). It can thus be concluded
that hypothesis I.R.l is
C•.....-J- ~
refuted and the opposite
;;[ .tL/r' u;.,.... ?
holds.
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Economic Hypothesis E.I
Hypothesis E.I That negative marginal percentage differsnces
between the minimum wage award and inflation will coincide
with positive values of M.P.V.CC.P.I). At timea when there
is a positive value of H.P.V.CC.P.I), the Full Bench will
award a minimuM wage increase below the increass in inflation,
such that the value for the dependent variable H.P.D.CH.W.)
will be negative. When H.P.V.CC.P.I) is negative, then the
Full Bench may award an above inflation minimum wage increase,
such that there is a positive value of M.P.D.CH.W.).
o e vations and Conclusions Period 1 21 cases 1956-1976
inclusive.
The Pearson correlation coefficient between the independant
variable H.P.V.CC.P.l) and the dependent variable H.P.D.CH.W.)
is .2033. The positive polarity of this coefficient indicates
that a positive value of the independent varieble H.P.V.CC.P.l)
coincides with a positive value of dependent variable
H.P.D.(.M.W.), refuting hypothesi a E.l, which postulates that
a positive value of H.P.V.CC.P.l' would coincide with a
negative value of the dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W.). On
the basis of the Pearson correlation coefficient, it could be
said that hypothesis E.l. is refuted.
Analysis of the partial correlation coefficients indicates
that there are no exogenous independent variables, significsntl
affecting the relationship between independent variable
MPV(C.P.l) and independent variable MPVCMW).
The magnitudes of the psrtisl correlation coefficients vary
from .1114 when controlling for the effects of H.P.D.(A.W.)
in the quarter prior to the National Wage Case, to a .axiaum
of .3974, when controlling for the effects of H.P~Vt (une~ploy
roent). This .eans that, in response to an increase in
inflation, the Full Bench would award e minimum wage increase
- 15 -
Bench would hesitate to sward an above inflation minimum
unemployment coinciding with the rise in inflation, the full
such that the value of M.P.D.(H.W,) is positive. However,
8 marginal percentage increase 1n unemployment, as indicated
by a positive value of MPV(unemployment), would probably
coincide with a positive value of M.p.V.(e.p.I), since the (
peerson correlation coefficient between M.p.V.{e.p.I) and
M.P.V (unemployment) is .5694. Perceiving the rise in
i\.<~
P- J
".:.{y.J
~ wage increase for fear of increasing unemployment. Moreover,
;e.""J .
Lin times of rising unemplyment, the ability of the unions
to bargain for above inflation minimum wage increases would
be diminished. Thus the restraining influence of
MPV(unemployment) holds the corrolation coefficient between
("'-~ t-tPD(MW) and MPV(CPl) at a lower magnitude. Controlling for
:~~( the effects of this restraining influence would increase
rr~the magnitude of the coefficient to .3974. The net effect
'7":~~. J' of controlling for all exogenous indepsndent variables is
a partial correlation coefficient of .3133, which could
indicate the strength of the impact of M.P.V. (unemployment)
in relation to the other variations.
2The increment to the coefficient of determination,
,
qenerated by in~luding H.P.V.(C.P.I) in the regression
equation for per!o~..l: is .07771, indicating tt.dt M.P.V.(C.P.I)
7· -;( 7. ' :-
determines ~1f771 per cent of the variationa in dependent
variable M.P.O.(H.W), which accounts for 31 percent of
the total of 2.239 percent of variations in M.P.D.(M.W)
caused by the combined effects of all the independent
variables. The beta coefficient of M.p.V(e.p.I) is .4313,
indicating that a variation of one unit in independent
variable M.p.V(e.p.I) would cause a variation of .4313 units
in M.P.D.(M.W), the independent variable.
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It can thu8 be concluded that hypothesis [1 is refuted
and its converse is true, namely, that 8 positive value
of MPV(CPl)wl11 coincide with a positive value of dependent
variable H.P.D.(H.W), Hop.V.(e.p.I} contributes to one
third of the variation in H.P.D.(H.W) caused by all the
independent variables co~binsd, which is minis.ule.
, ,
Hypothesis E.l Period 2 1956-1975 - Excluding Wage Indexation
---The Pearson correlation between dependent variable
H.P.D.(H.W.) and H.P.V (C.P.I) for period 2 is .2511, which
indicates that there is 8 slight tendency for the full Bench
to respond to 8
sbove inflation
positive value of H.p.V.(e.p.I), with an
incresse in the minimum wage such that vi
H.P.D.(H.W) has a positive value, thus refuting hypothesis
El, and confirming its antithesis, naMely that a positive
value of H.P.V.(C.P.I) coincides with a positive value of
H.P.D.(H.W). The relationship between H.P.D.(M.W.) snd
H.p.V.(e.p.l) in period 2 is similar to that for period 1.
The elimination of the dsta for the National Wage Cases
under the wage indexation guidelines 'a8 not made a major
difference to the relationship between dependent variable
M.P.D.(M.W.) and independent variable H.P.V.(C.P.I).
The Partial Correlation coefficients rsnge in .agnitude
from a ~inimu. of -.0192, when controlling for H.P.D.(A.W).
to a m8xi~um of .4228 when controlling for the effecte of
MPV (unemployment). Controlling for all exogenoue independent
.0800.
variables produces a partial
, ?
correlation coefficient of
The partial correlation coefficient of -.0192 could be aaid
to indicate that dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W) varies with
H.P.V.(C.P.l) mainly becauee H.P.D.(A.N.) varies along
with both the dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W.). with a
correlation coefficient of .5379, and with H.P.V.(C.P.I),
rendering H.P.D.(A.W.) an
~ J11v.....H P.r -'7 ,.. yJ
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with a correlation of .4929. This set of relationships
S88MS to indicate thst, for period 2, hypothesis El
postulstes a spurious relationship.
It could be argued that controlling #'or H.P.O.(A.W.) could
be methodologically debatable, since increases in the
sversge wsge probably contribute to increases in the
consumer price index, thus
.----.....,.~enLng variable.~
However, it should be coneidered that average wage increases
are not the sale factor determining the nsture of increases
in the consumer price index. Autonomous increaass in prices,
b-th in terms of local production and imported goods, play
a significant role. Since the extent to which H.P.D.(A.W.)
is an interve~ing variable is uncertain, its effects were
controlled for for expl.ratory purposes.
The partial correlation coefficient of .4248 achieved by
controlling for H.P.V. (unemployment) is a substantial
increase on the Pearson correlation coefficient of .2511.
This difference might indicate that if not for fear of
cauaing increases In unemployment, the Full 8ench would award
sbove inflation miniMum wage increases so that the value ofg.... ;1-";" ,,,".vi
dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W.) would b~~o~~i:,ve. This
observation is borne out by the correlation coefficient
between H.P.O.(H.W.) and H.P.V.(unemployment) would coincide
with s negative vslue of H.P.D.(H.W.). This indicates the
Full Bench .. desire to counterbalance the coincidence between
incresses in inflstion and increases in unemployment, 8S
indicated by a correlation coefficient of .3666.
The foregoing indicates that, although the s1gn of the
correlstion coefficient is positive, refuting hypothesis
El, the effects of factors such as HPV(unemplDyment) reduces
- 18 -
the magnitude of the coefficient towards zero and negative
signs, which, if accompanied by magnitudes above .1000,
would indicate slight confirmation of hypothesis El.
Controlling for the combined effect~ of M.P.D.(A.W.)
and H.P.V.(productivity) produces a partial correlation
coefficient of -.2048, which indicates that a positive
value of M.p.V.(e.p.l) coincidea with a negative value of
the dependent variable H.P.O.(H.W.), thus confirming
hypothesis E.l. However, this is subject to doubts about
M.P.D.(A.W) being an intervening variable, and should be
egarded cautiously.
T~e increment to the overall coefficient of deter~ination
caused by adding H.P.V.(C.P.l) to the regression equation
for period 2 ie .00240, which indicates that M.P.V.(C.P.I)
contributesO.'24 percent of the variation in the dependent
variable M.P.D.(H.W) out of a total of 62 percent of
variation in M.P.D.(H.W.) accounted for by all the independent
variables combined. The Beta coefficient for H.P.C.(C.P.l)
is .0695290, which indicates that a variation of one unit
in HPV(C.P.I) will cause a variation of .0695290 units in
dependent variable H.P.D.CH.W).
Thus it can be concluded that hypotheais EI ia refuted due
to the fact its antithesis is slightly confirmed, as well
aa the fact that 8 number of partial correlation coefficients
indicate that hypothesis E1 may postulate a spurious
relationship between the dependent and independent variables.
The situation in both periods one and two regarding the
relationahip between H.P.V.(C.P.I} and dependent variable
H.P.D.(M.W.} is similar. However, the re~oval of the wage
indexation cases from the data causes the contributio~ of
M.p.v.(e.p.I) to the vsriations in dependent variable

C.P.l.
must have played a significant part in the variation in
H.P.D.(H.W.) during the Wag~indexation periods which is
only to be expected, 8inc~the basia of the w8ge indexation
gUidelines W98 the increa~e in inflation S8 measured by the
.,
x
H.p.l{e.p.l) to decrease, indicting
f'11j-'ZPi--- .
that H.P.V.(C.P.l)
Hypothesis (1 Period) - Observations and Concluaions.
The Peareon correlation between dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W)
and independent vsriable H.P.V. (C.P.l) is .1550, indicating
that there i8 a alight relationship. The positive polarity
of the coefficient indicates that positive valuee, rather
than negative values a8 p~~~~~l,of
M.P.V.(C.P.I) ooincideswith positive ~alue~f dep~
ari.ble M.P.D.(H.~~ivevalues coincide with
negative vslues. ~ indicates that hypotheais E1 ia
refuted, if the Pearson correlation coefficient i8 considered
by itseH.
The pertis1 correlation coefficients renge fro. e .inimu.
of .D5S9 when controlling for M.r.V. (unemployment) to _
.5161 whsn controlling for both H.P.D. (A.W.) and H.P.V.(W.O~l)
The negatiVity of some of the partial correlation coefficients
confirm hypothesis E1, and there are eome positive p8rtial
correlation coefficients which refute hypothesis El.
Controlling for H.P.V.(une.ploy.ent) reduces the correlation
coefficient to .0539, which indicates that the dependent
variable H.P.D.(H.W) is related to independent variable
H.P.V.(C.P.I) mainly because they are both carrelated with
H.P.V. (unemployment. M.P.V.(C.P.I), the independent
variable, correlates to M.P.V.(unemp1oyment) with 8 eoefficent
of .4157, and dependent variable M.P.O. (H.W) correlates to
H.P.V. (une.-pIoylllont, with 8 coefficient, of .2480. The
relationship via H.P.V. (unemploYMent) is stronger than the
direct relationship between H.P.D.{H.W.) and H.P.V (C.P.I)y
"'-S"<-,,, Itcl .. £...., ..,.4 ...J:-r"" 'fd- ~~:'r'C,..a.~·uf5 --,,«~ .~. ~ . ,
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so that for period J, the relationship postulated by
hypothesis £1 ~ay be regarded ae spurioua. There ere so~e
psrtial correlation coefficients of positive polarity •.
which refute hypothesi a £1, While thoae of negative polarity
tend to support hypothesi. [1.
Adding H.P.V.(C.P.I) to the regression equation for period
three increments the coefficient of determination by .07526,
which ~een9 thst 7.5 percent of the veriation in the
dependent ~srieble H.p.a.(H.W.) coincides with veriation
in the independent verieble H.P.V. (C.P.I). The beta
coefficient for M.P.V.(C.P.I) in period three is - .4512,
which indicetes that en increase of one unit in independent
v .. risble M.P.V. (C.P.I) coincides with a decreaae of - .4512
unite in independent variable H.P.O. (M.W.), and a one unit
decrease in M.P.V.(C.P.ll coincides with .4512 unita increaae
in M.P.D.(M.W). This negativity of the Beta coefficient
supports hypothesis [I, which postulatea that marginal
percentage increasea in the-C.P.I. should coincide with
below inflation ~inimum W8ge swards by the full Bench, and
/ net decreases in the C.P.l should coincide with above infletion
1 ~inimum wage awards by the Full Bench. Thus, iF considering
Jthe Peareon and pertiel correletion coeFficiente, it ~ight
i'{ be concluded that hypotheais £1 ie refuted. If the Beta
coeFficient ie coneidered, it ce" be concluded thet hypothesis
[1 is confirmed. Since there ere only six caees evaluated!
in period three, with ell the potentiel inaccuracy that this I
implies, both concluaione should be regarded with csution,
even though the eix cases ere regarded ss comprising a
ststistical universe.
..",.~ ~,('-'
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Economic Hypothesis
Hypothesis E.l. That the full Bench will be more inclined
to grant an above inflation ~inimum wage increase, such
that the value of dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W} is positive
when the H.P.¥ (productivity) of labour, or internal rate
of return of labour, is positive. In other words, the full
Bench is more likely to grant real wage increase a if, in
the Quarter prior to the increase in the minimum wage, there
is a real increase in productivity such that H.P.V.
(productivity) is positive. In other words, positive values
of H.P.V(productivity) coinc1des with positive values of
H P.D.(H.W), the dependent variable.
Observations and Conclusion, (cono_ic Hypothesis E2 Period 1
21 csses 1956-1976.
The Pesrson correlation coefficient for the relationship
between the dependent variable M.P.O.(H.") and the
independent variable H.P.V. (productivity) is .0544, the
magnitude of which indicates that there is virtually no
relationship between the dependent and independent variablea.
The concluaion to be drawn from this result ia that, since
the
the
The
magnitude is not large enough to confirm the hypothesis,
I, r.··' II
hypothesis must stand refuted. (NA" (A'-'C"1"-....t) * r
u-.. <'-;)
magnitudea of the partial correlation coefficients
confirma the refutation of hypothasis E2, since none of the
partial correlation coeffi.leAts is equal to or greater than
.1000, which is the minimum value at which it is possible to
hint at a relationship between the dependent and independent
variablea. When controlling for all exogenous independent
variables, for example, the partial correlation coefficient
is .0289.
Adding M.P.V (productiVity) to the regression equation for
period 2 cauees en increment to the coefficient of
deter.ination of .00065, which indicates that H.P.V.
/- 22 -
(productivity) accounts for .065 per cent of all variations
in the dependent variable M.P.O.(M.W). The beta coefficient
for H.P.O.(productivity) is - .0211420, indicating that an
increase of one unit in M.P.V. (prod~ctivity) results in a
decrease of .027142 units in dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W).
It can thus be concluded that hypothesis E2 is disproved for
period 1 because of the absence of a relationship between
the dependent and independent variables. In other words, the
full Bench does not react in any specific manner to changes
in productivity of labour when considering increases to the
minimum wage.
Ohservations and Conclusions; Hypothesis E2 Period 2.
The Pearson correlation coefficient is .1839, which slightly
confirms hypothesis E2. The partial correlation coefficients
range in magnitude from .1264, when controlling for both
d'M.P~ "(C.P.I) and M.D.P.(M.W.lag), together, to a maximum
of .5678 when controlling for the effects of both H.P.V.
(unemployment) and H.D.P. (A.W) together. All these partial
correlation coefficients, do, to some extent, indicate
confirmation of hypothesis E2. The reason for the relatively
high partial correlstion obtained when controlling for both
M.P.D.{A.W.) and M.P.V. (unemployment) is that there is a
relationship between M.P.V. (unemployment) and H.D.P. (A.W.)
indicated by a Pearson Correlation coefficient of -.1177,
which indicates that a decrease in M.P.D.(A.W) will coincide
with an increase in M.P.V. (unemployment). This inverse
relationship is reflected in interactions with the independent
variable M.P.V.{productivity). The correlation between
M.P.V. (unemployment) and M.P.V.{productivity) is .4117,
indicating that a pesitive value of M.P.V{productivity)
coincidea with 8 positive value of M.P.V. (unemploy~ent)
whilst the correlation coefficient between M.P.V.(productivity)
and H.P.D.(average
~ values of
~
wage) i~1216BI indicating that
H.p.v.{~dUCfivitY) slightly coincide
with ~gel i.e values of M.P.O. (average wage).
I..-u'
~The strong relationahip between H.P.D.{A.W) and H.P.D{H.H),
as illustrated by the magnitude of the Pearson correlation
coefficient of .5379, ia coupled inversely via the relatively
weak correlation between H.P.V.(unemployment) and! M.P.D.(A.W.), to the strong positi¥e relationship between
H.P.V.(unemployment) and independent ¥ariable M.P.V.(pro4uct
ivHy) •
Thus a net increase in producti¥ity will coincide with sn
increase in H.P.V.(unemployment). Howe¥er, this net increase
in H.P.V.(unemployment) also coincides_with a net decrease
> ,-
in the s¥ersge wage. The~e coincidences occur in relation
to the quarter immediately preceding that in which the
.inimum wage award is made. Therefore it appears that the
presence of unemployment will reduce the willingness of the
full Beach to increase real wages following an increase in
M.P.V.(productivity). Thus controlling for the link betwsen
M.P.V.(unemployment) and M.P.D.(H.W.) increases the magnitude
of the correlation coefficient between the independent variable
M.P.V.(productivity) and dependent variable M.P.D.(H.W.).
The Pearson correlation coefficient produced by controlling
for all exogenous independent variables is .392275, which ia in
line with the above observations, and indicates slight
confirmation of hypothesis E.2.
The increment to the coefficient of determination caused by
adding H.P.V.(productivity) to the regression equation for
period two is .09477, which indicates that variations in
H.P.O.(productivity) contribute nine percent to all the
variations of the dependent variable; H.P.D.(H.W). The beta
coefficient for H.P.V.(H.W) ia .5051642, which indicates that
a one unit variation in H.P.V.(productivity) induces a
variation of, in the same direction, of .5051642 units in
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H.P.D.(H.W.). This indicates that net changes in labour
productivity play a part in the deliberations of the full
bench on the matter of increases in the minimUM wage,
although only a small part. Hypothesis E2, is, for period
Z, thus confirmed, although slightly. A net increaae in
productivity of lebour will have a slight influence in
persueding the full bench to grant an above inflation
minimu~ wage increase.
Hypothesis (2 Period 3 Observations and Conclusione.
The Pearson correlation of -.6614 is a strong refutation
of hypothesis EZ, indicating that a positive value of
H.P.V.(productivity) will coincide with a negative value
of the dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W.), while hypothesis
E2 postulates that a positive value of the independent
variable H.P.V.(productivity coincides with a negative value of
H.B.D.(HW), the dependent variable.
The abeolute magnitudes of the partial correlation
coefficients range to -.9592.or when controlling for both
M.P.D.(A.W) and M.P.V.(unemployment), together. Controlling
for these two variables together also produced the highest
partial correlation coefficient in period one. The pearson
correlation coefficients between H.p.n.(.A.W.) and
H.P.V.(unemployment) are relatively low, but they are
strongly correlated to the independent veriable H.P.V
(productivity) and dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W). Controlling
for the variables pair HPV(unemployMent .and H.P.O.(.A.W)
causes a substantial"increase in the coefficient correlating
the dependent and independent veriebles. H.P.V.(unemplpyment)
cor.elates to independent variable M.P.V.(productivity) with
a coefficient of -.5450, and H.P.D.(A.W.) correlates to
H.P.V.(productivity) with a coefficient of .4924.
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Thus, a negative value of M.P.Y.(unemployment) concide
with a positive value of M.P.D.(H.W), the dependent
Y8ria~~e, which reduces the correlation between dependent
variable H.P.D.CH.W) and the independent variable
M.P.V.(productivity). Controlling for the pair of variables
H.P.V.(unemployment) and H.P.D.(A.W.) eliminates this
dampening influence, raising the correlation coefficient
to - 9592.
Independent variable H.P.V.(productivity) correlates
strongly to H.P.V.(W.D.l), as does dependent ysriable
M.P.D.(H.W.) with coefficient of .6878 and - .7312, both of
".Iich are greater then the correlation coefficient between
H.P.D.CH.W.) and HoP.V.( productivity) of -.6614. It
might be said that, to some extent, dependent variable
H.P.D.(H.W} varies with independent variable H.P.Y.(product
ivity) mainly because they both correlate strongly with
H.P.Y.(W.O.C}. Controlling for H.P.O.(W.O.L} reduces the
co-efficient with which H.P.OCM.H) correlates H.P.Y.(
(productivity) to -.3312. The negativity o~ the partial
correlation coefficients, suggests that a positive value of
H.P.Y.(productivity) .ay coincide with a bel~w inflation
mini~uM wage award, instead of an above inflation .ini~um
wage award as postulated by hypothesis [2. The same effect
holds for a positive value of H.P.Y.(productivity) coinciding
with a positive value of H.P.V.(W.O.L), which strongly
correlates with a below inflation minimum wage sward.
This is borne out by 8 bets coefficient of H.P.Y.(productivity)
of -.6701754, which indicates that a one unit increase in
HPV(productivity) would coincide with a decrease of .6701754
units in dependent variable H.P.O.(H.W), which would
probably be a manifestation of a below inflation minimum
wage award. Adding H.P.Y.(productivity) to the regression.
equation for period three incre_ents the coefficient of
deter~ination by .08618 units) indicating that 8.618
percent of variations in dependent varieble H.P.D.(H.W.)
coincide with variation in independent variable
HP.V.(productivity).
The conclusion can therefore be drawn to the effect that
hypothesis E.2) which postulates that a positive value of
MPV(productivity) coincides with above inflation minimum
wage awards, is refuted in favour of an antithesis postulating
a below inflation minimum wage award coinciding with a
pOlitive value of H.P.V.(productivity•• This may be due
riU"? 7" """--"'"
to the elllinishing marginal rste of return of labour
during period three, coupled with rising inflation, prompting
the Full Bench to award at or above inflation minimum award
inversely with the dependent variable H.O.D.CH.W.),
wages in accordance wi th the wage indexation guidelin.!.-s..•.
~ 1'--'- ,~'o< f· ,;p - ---""1~olllic Hypothesis 0 t ~-"1 ~ / J.!t1 't...i.,......c ..~
Hypothesis E.3. That the H.P.V. (une.ployment) will vart-/
J
such inverse variation being manifested by negative values
of M.P.V. (unemployment) coinciding with positive values
of the dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W.). In other words,
a net decrease In unemployment in the quarter immediately
preceding the award of the minimum wage increase will
coincide with a~~ l8inillum wage above
inflation. Conversely, a net increase in une.ployment will
probably occur in the quarter preceding the granting of a
below inflation minimum wage increase.
Hypothesis E 3 Period 1
Conclusions.
21 cases Observations and
The neg8tiv~ sign of the Pearson correlation coefficient
of -.2046 indicstes confirmation of the hypothesia E3,
in that positive values of H.P.V.(unemployment) coincide
with neoative values of the dependent variable
H.P.D(~M.W.),
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and negative values of H.P.V.(unemployment)
are likely to coincide with positive values of H.P.D.(H.W.).
The magnitude of the Pearson correlation coefficient indicates,
however, that the hypothesis E3 is only slightly confirmed.
The partiel correlation coefficients vary in ~agnitude
from a minimum of-.0987 when controlling for both M.P.D.(A.W)
and H.P.I(W.D.l.), together"to a maximum of -.4153 when
controlling for the effects of both H.P.D.(H.N.lag) and
and H.P.V.(p.P.I.t Although, in relative terms, the
magnitude of the partial correlation cJefficient of -.0987
is a minor reduction fram the magnitude of the Pearson
correlation coefficient of -.2046, it _ay be attributed to
the strength of the correlation between the independent variablE
M.P.V.(unemployment) and H.P.V.(C.P.I) as indicated by a
Pearson correlation coefficient of the magnitude of .5694,
and to the correlation between H.p.V.(e.p.I) and H.P.D.(A.W)
of .2926, and to the correlation coefficient of .3302 between
H.P.D.(A.W) and the dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W). Thus
there is an indirect chain of three correlation coefficients
linking the independent vsriable H.P.V.(unemployment) ta the
dependent variable H.P.D.(M.W). Each af the correlation
coefficients invol~ed in this chain of relationships is
greater in magnitude than the direct correlation between
H.P.Y.(unemployment) and H.P.D(H.N.) of -.2046. It might
therefore be suggested that M.P.V.(unemployment varies with
H.P.D.(H.W.) mainly because both the dependent and independent
variables vary with the pair of variables H.P.D.(A.N.) and
H.P.V.C.(C.P.I). Thus the hypothesized relationship might
be said to be spurious when controlling for these variablee.
The highest magnitude obeerved in the partial correlation
coefficients is obtained when controlling for both H.P.V.L
(W.D.l.) and H.P.D.(A.W) together, is -.4153. This csn be
attributed to a chain of correlation cosfficients such that
the partial correlation coefficient between the independent
variable H.P.V.(unemployment) and the dependent variable
H.P.D.(H.W.) is -.4389. Between H.P.V.(W.D.L.) and H.P.D.(A.W:
the pearson correlation coefficient ie ."02. Each of the
coefficients in the chain is greeter in magnitude than the
Pearson correlation coefficient between the independent
variable H.P.V.(unemployment) and the dependent variable
H.P.D.(H.W.). The presence of negative correlation coefficient
in the chain of coinciding relationships and their dispersion
therein, indicates an inverse relationship via the chain of
coeffic.....ients. Thus a net increaae in unemployment coincides
~ with 8 net decrease in the number of working days lost through
,
strike action, which coincides with a net increase in the
t.",,--eJ~,e
average wage. Thus a . _ .. Mbf increasing unemployment,
increasing average wages and a decrease in the number of
working days lost through strike action,~ tempts the full
bench to award 8 below inflation minimum way increase.
Controlling for all exogenous independent variables produces
a partial correLation coefficient of -.1575, which fits
in with the above observations.~
~... ,/r-r-~ (Z:.", 1. .
~~n~ the vsriable H.p.V.(un~mploy.ent) to the regression
of determination of .02158, which indicates thet net
movements in unemployment determine 2 per cent of the total
variations in the dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W.). The beta
coefficient of -.4068871 indicetes that an increase of one
unit of unemployment will cauee a decrease of ".4068871
units in H.P.D.(H.W.), thus confirming hypothesis E3 in
period one. ThUS, it can be concluded that a negative value
of H.P.D.(H.W.) may coincide with a positive value of
~ P.V.(unemDloyment).
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Econo~ic Hypothesis £3 - Period 2 Observations and
Conclusions.
The Pearson correlation coefficient between the independent
variable M.P.V.(unemployment) and M.P.D.(H.W.), the dependent
variables is -.3321. The magnitude and the negative sign
of this coefficient indicates that hypothesis £3 is slightly
confirmed. The Pearson correlation coefficient of -.3321
for period 2 is slightly higher than that for period one.
-.2046, ss is the case with the partial correlation
coefficients. This could be due to the fact that period 1
covers 21 cases. whereas period 2 covers 14 csses.
The magnitude of the partial correlation coefficients range
in magnitude from a minimum observed value of -.1147 when
controlling for both M.P.D.(A.W.) and H.P.V.(W.D.l.) together,
to a maximum observed value of -.5575. when controlling
for H.P.V.(C.P.I) and M.P.V.(productivity) together.
Controlling for the pair of variables M.p.V.(e.p.I) and
M.P.V.(productivity) also achiev~s, the maximum observed
correlation coefficient in period one, indicating that the
removal of the data for the national wage cases operating
under the wage indexation guidelines does not drastically
alter the inter-relationships between variables.
The Pearson correlation coefficient between the independent
variable M.P.V.(unemployment) and M.P.V. 'W.D.l) is -.6405.
and that between M.P.V.(W.D.l) and M.P.D.(A.W.) is .3363,
and between H.P.D.(A.W.) and the dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W)
it is .5379. This indicates that the relationship between
the dependent and independent variables is stronger through
the pair of variables M.P.V.(.W.D.l) and M.P.D.(A.W) than
through the direct pearson correlation co~fficient between
the independent variable M.P.V.(unemployment) and the
dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W.), which is -.3321. This
mense that the independent variable H.P.V.(unemployment)
varies with the dependent variable M.P.D.(H.W.) ~8inly
because both the dependent and independent variables vary
with the pair of variables H.P.D.(A.W.) and M.P.V.(W.D.L).
This might be said to render the direct relationship between
H.P.D.(H.W.) and H.P.V. (une~ployment) spurious. This was als'
the case for period I when the variables H.P.D.(.A.W) and
H.P.V.(W.D.l) were both controlled for together. The net
relationShip of these 'bypass' correlations, in both
instances, is the same as that for tho direct pearson
correlation coefficient, which he8 a negative sign. In other
words, during period two, a negative value of HPV(unemployment
would tend to precede a deciaion by the full bench to award
an increaae in the minimum wage such that the value of
__._$
H.P.D.(M.Ii.) i~ positive, which-1e eeA.i:ehn' "ttrran above
inflation minimum wege increase. If the relationship between
H.P.D.(H.W) and H.P.V.(unemploy~ent) could be said to be
spurious, there could not be sny implications of a causative
relationship between MP.D.(H.W.) and M.P.V.(unemployment).
Instead, it could be suggested that the negative value of
M.P.V.(unemployment) coincides with the positive value of
M.P.O. 'M.W.) fpr the same reasons that a negative value of
M.P.V.(unemployment) coincides with positive values of
M.P.V.(W.D.l) which in turn coincides with a negative value
of M.P.O.(A.W.), in turn coinciding with 8 positive value of
the dependent variable M.P.D.(H.W.). Thus a marginal
decrease in unemployment coincides with an above
minimum wege awerd for probably the 88~S~
marginal decrease in unemployment cOin~th
inflation
that a
net increase
in the num~er of working days lost th~ough industrial dispute:
which coincides with a below inflati·on illct'8ase observed in
the average wage, which might precede the granting of an
above inflation minimum wage increose. The ma9nitudes of the
corr~l~tion coefficients suggeat that the direct coincidences
between the changes in independent variable H.P.V.(unemployment
and dependent variable tl-P.O.(H.W) is weaker than
relationships via H.P.O.(A.W.) and H.P.V.(W.D.l).
The probable resaons why controlling for the effects of
M.p.V.(e.p.I) and H.P.V.(productivity) causea the magnitude
of the correlation coefficient to increase are twofold, but
related. In the first instances, there are the correlations
between each of M.P.V.(productivity) and HP.V.(C.P.I) on
tne independent variable H.P.V.(unemployment), as indicated
by correlation coefficients of .4119 and .3666 respectively.
Secondly, there is the effect of the string of correlation
coefficients in parallel with the direct Pearson Correlation
coefficient between the independent variable M.P.V.
(une~ployment) snd the dependent variable H.P.D.(H.H.), such
thst the correlation between M.P.V.(productivity) is .4119,
between M.P.V.(productivity) and M.P.V.(C.P.I.) it is .2508,
and between MP.V.(C.P.I) and the dependent variable ILP.D.(M.W)
it is .2410. Thus a marginal decrease in unemployment will
coincide with a marginal decrease in productivity, which will
coincide with a marginal decreose in inflation, which in turn
coincides with a below inflation minimum wage award. This is
in contrast with, and offsets, the coincidence between
negative values of the independent variable H.P.V.(unemployaent
and a positive value of the dependent variable H.P.D.(H.W.),
Thus, where there are, in parallel, direct and indirect
relationships indicated by cor.elation coefficients af apposln>
polarities, i.e. positive and negative, the direct Pearson
correlation coefficients between the dependent and independent
variables are effectively reduced 1n aagnitude. Thus,
controlling for the variablea constitutlnc the indirect
relationship, H.P.V.(C.P.I) and H.P.V.(productivity) would
have the effect of removino the offsettino influence and
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thereby raising the magnitude of the correlation coefficient
to, in this case, -.5575.
Adding M.P.V.(unemployment) to the regression equation
for period 2 causes the coefficient of determination to
be incremented by .18396, indicating that, for period 2, changE
in unemployment induce 18 per cent of the variation in the
dependent variable M.P.D.(M.W.). The beta coefficient for
H.P.V.(unemployment) in period 2 is -.4121725, indicating that
an increase of one unit~in H.P.V. (unemployment) induces a
variation of -.4121725 unita in dependent variable, thus
confirming hypothesis E.3, namely, that net increase in
M ?V.(unemployment) will induce a net decrease in the value
of HPD(MW).
Economic Hypothesis E.3 period 3 3/75 to 11/76 (Wage
Indexation).
Observations:
The Pearson correlation coefficient is .24BO which indicates
that there is a positive relationship between the independent
variable M.P.V.(unemployment) and 11.P.D.(M.W.), the dependent
variable. In this situation, a negative value of H.P.V.
(unempl~yment) would coincide with a negative value of
dependent variable M.P.D.(M.W.). As the hypothesis postulates
that the polarity of the coefficienb of correlation between
M.O.V.(unemployment) and HP.D.(M.W.) be negative, the
hypothesis is refuted, on the basis of the characteristics
of the Pearson correlation coefficient.
The partial correlateon coefficients are diverse in
character, with correlation coefficients having negative
and positive polarity present. The negative correlation
coefficients range in magnitude from a minimum of -.0347
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when controlling for both M.p.V.(e.p.I) and M.P.V.(.W.D.l)
together, to a maximum of -.8849 when controlling for
M.P.J.(A.W.) and M.P.V.(productivity). The latter is also
the correlation coefficient with the maximum observed
magnitude of all period 3 partials when analysing
hypothesis E.3. The positive partial correlations range
in magnitude from .6855 when controlling for both r~.p.D.
(H.W.lag) and M.P.V.(productivity) to a maximum of .8422
when controlling for both M.P.D (M.W.lag) and M.p.V.(e.p.I),
As there are two partial correlation coefficients below
.1000, while the pearson correlation is .2480, it might
v~ assumed that for the six cases in the period Harch 1975,
hypothesis E.3. postulates a spurious relationGhip.
This suggestion is based on the assumption that none of the
variables controlled for are intervening variables. This
assumption has been made for all three periods, since
increases in unemployment could be due to structural causes,
such as the introduction of automation, the transfer of an
operation to a cheap labour area, or closure of firms due
to competition from cheaper exports. 1
Considering that a spurious relationships are revealed twice,
and the presence of various correlation coefficients having
both positive and negative polarity, and since there are
a wide range of magnitudes evident among the partials, it
can be concluded that for the six cases in the wage
indexation period during 1975 and 1976, hypothesis E3 is
refuted.
Adding the independent variable M.P.V.(unemployment) to
the regression equation increments the coefficient of
determinstion by .0618, whicll indicates 6.18 per cent of the
variations in the dependent variable M.P.D.(M.W.) coincide
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with variations in the independent variable M.P.V. (unemploy
ment). The beta value for independent variable M.P.V.
(unemployment) is .413862, which indicates thatan increase
of .413862 units in the dependent variable M.P.D.(M.W.)
coincides with an increase of one unit in the independent
variable M.P.V. (unemployment). This does not agree with
hypothesis £3 which postulates that a net increase in
unemployment, manifested as a positive value of M.P.D.
(unemployment), coincides with a below inflation minimum wage
award, manifested as a negative value of M.P.D.(M.W.).
The reason for this is that, during period three, the main
influence on H.P.D.(M.W.) has been variations in M.P.D.(W.Dl),
which accounts for 53.462 per cent of the variation in
M.P.D.(M.W.), compared to the 6.18 per cent for M.P.V.
(unemployment). This supports the conclusion that for all
practical purposas, hypothesis E.3. is refuted in period
three.
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Political Hypothesis 1 Pl.
Th. Full Bench ie aore likely to .~ard en abo.. inflatioD
.iatau. va~. incr.a.e when • part~ a~patb.tlc to the Labour
eOT•••nt, such aa the Auatrelia. Labour Perty, t. in office.
than whan • pro-••player and anti-union perty euch as the Liberal
Party 1. in go.ernment.
Ob.er.etiona:
Pr•••nted o••rI••t 1. tb. date for the.~ wac•••••••
claaalfie4 acoordlQS to tbe political party wbieb v.. 1. the
federal go.eruaent ia Canberre. Li8te4 are the ~taAdardl.ed
Talu•• of the HPY(MW), HPV(CPI) &Ad tbe differanoe bet••••
--------HPV(HW) and HPV(CPI), whioh i. HPD(HW). !he•• are 11.te4 in
Table A. Since th. political party in power t. • noai..l t~
datua. vhich i. Dot ...nabl. to Pear.OD oorrel.tioD an&1y.ia,
aiaple percentag•• are u.a. aa • b.. ia of o.apart.oa. ~.
percent.ses or the .iniaua vas. incr....s are or0a8 tabUlated
vith t~e political parties in Ta~le 8.
( -/ ~ TABLE
IARGUjl,L P.JtQ4!jl'AGE
IIUw'1!'TJJR PI Il1ffiW
~
A.
l~SGItlAL PERCENTAGE l-fr1)C!iO.
!lFl'S'BJIIN nWrrO!l.
/<!lli!lR ooyER!i!-Em' •
1m 18 6 12.00
1974 13 14
-
1.00
1975 12 6 6.00
1975 5 4 1.00
1975 4 4 0.00
LIBERAL GQY:';!OO£Nl'S •
1956 ~ 0 0.00
1957 r 101,- -r; ~ ,,""" 5.0 -99.00
1958 - 29M' ~: ,'/ . 200 -2942
1959 '-.----' 2.0 2.0 0.0
1961 6.0 8.0 2.0
1964 4.0 1.0 J.O
1966 7.0 8.0 - . 1.0
1967 6.0 J.o J.O
1968 18.0 J.O 15.0
1969 9.0 J.o G.O
1971 9.0 6.0 J.o
1972 10.0 8.0 2.0
IABOU'R C'.oVJ(tJ.1EllI 1973. 1974. l$5.
1976 6.0 6.0 0.0
1976 6.0 J.o J.o
1976 J.o JJ) 0.0
1976 J.O 2.0 1.0
-:' u.. '!ABlE ••,
BELew I1WLATION. At INFLlTIOU. ABOVE INFLATION.
lABOUR '}J$ '}J$ 6af, 100~
LIB.::!tAL 26.661- '}J$ 53.33% 100';
OVlAALL JJ.J~ 26.66% 40.0]$ lOO'S
Conclusions: Hypothesis P.l.
As can 00 obscrved, 60 per cont of the increases were abow
inflation W¥!er Labour am. 533 per cent 'Were abow inflation urder
the Liberal Governments, and, coofleoantaril;r, 26.6 per cent of
the minllnum ....a::;e awards VON belo.... intlation wen the Liberal Parly
vas in govern:lCnt, as conpe.red to 20 per cent wan the Labour Part:r
"lao in (;OVOrJll!lODt. On the fact of it, h7P0thea1s P.I. 'WUld aee.
to be sl~tly confirmed. Howevor, this sl1ght con!irllll1>i.on of the
hf90thesis that above 1n!lation mJ oj ..rm ..age increases are more
likely to occur when the Laoom- Party is in gO'gerIDlnt, should DOt
be tclten as an indic.:ltion that tb.1s pGrly being in goftrument in any
....ay causes or influences the Full Bench of the Concillation am
Arbitration Col!l'!lission to award cbove intlation increaaes. This 18
because the Australian Labour Perty was 1n goftnment for,ap}'rOXimately,
only 25,; of the usgs hearings, whilst 7~ of the ""p'·"mll l/l18!I bearings
took p1..:lcc vhilst the Liberal Party was in goverreent. The differences
bct\roen tho r.crccnta.,."es of the tnnimum "'age avarda \oIhioh ere above and
0010\1 inflation, IllOY be caused b~' chtl.!JCEls in the economic var1.ab los,
jSUCh as 1-:PV(Cl'I). If 75 per cent of the llational Wage Cases had taken
plccc while t.'1c '\ustralinn Labour Party \1o.S in government, instead of
tLe Liber.:ll : ".:ll"t.,:', the percento.~s of m1ni.J:::uJm "laze ine:reases awarded
above inlllltion nay we 11 have been s1.mil..o.r to those granted vhilst the
Liberal l'.:lrty was in govern.'!lcnt.
•
A ,.g
74
MULTIPLE REGRESSION EQUAUOftS.
Multiple reSreSSiOD analy8i. i. a teohnique which can be
utili~ed to determine the degree of linear depe.dence of
dependent v~riable H.P.D.(M.W.) on the .i~ i~dependent variable.
H.P.D.(H.W.lag), K.P.V.(C.P.I), ",P,D.(A.V.)t M.P.V.(une.ployaent),
(''I tH.P.V.(W.D.L.) and H.P.V.(productiyity). ~e concern i. with the
strength of the dependence, or equivalently. with the aaouat of
.eriation in dependent variable H.P.D.(M.W) that oan' be .xplaiD.ed /
by liaear dependence UpOD. the .i~ independent variabl•• operatiag f
jointly. For this purpose, the aultipl. corre1atioa coeffici.nt ~
Rand the aultipl. coeffioient of d.teraiaatioa.2 would yiel' ~
the appropriate infor.atioa. For p.riod I, iacorporatlas all the
21 case. from 1956 to 1976 inclusive, the ~ i ••22390, iadioatiag
that 22.39 per cent of the variation ia d.pendeat variable H.P.D.(HV)
i. explained by the six independent variable. H.P.V.(C.P.I.).
M.P.D.(A.W). H.P.V.(unemploy.ent), M.P.V.(W.D.L), H.P.D.(H.W.las)
) (' .. ..,and H.P.V.(produotivity • r-.-f-.;....-~
In order to predict the value. of the dep.ndent variable
H.P.D.(H.W). the value of the con.tant £ and tha Beta.valua. are
employed to obtain the pradictioD. resres8ion aquation, with which
• preducted M.P.D.(H.W) .alue for ~ giYen co.bination of tha in-
dependent variable. H.P.D.(H.W.lag). H.P.V.(C.P.I). H.P.D.(A.W).
H.P.V.(unemplo~ent. H.P.V.(W.D.L) and H.P.V.(productiyity). Tha
generalized form of the regression aquation 18:-
I:> 0-' is' ~ ~...., < «,/
r :. a +& Var 1 b2 Variable 2"* b. Vari.bl. ft.
a conetant which is added to eaoh Oaee aad@ b2. ba are thall"
coefficients. which are standardised Yarslona of the partial
regression coefficients, wh1ch are ....ur•• of the lafl.enc. of
each independent variable UpOn the d.pendant variable with adjuot-
ments made for all other independeat variables. fa other worde,
the beta ooefficient is the partial oorr.Latio. oo.ttioi,nt achieved ;f
vhen controllias for all exogano.. lade,.••eat variabl••, which is vi
the reason why it has b.eD us.d wh••....-l7.f..a&: the ~th•••• con-
cerni.g each ind.pendent variabl••
•
'l'he reaeOD why a~ 1ap&rt1a1 re~••10. CO.tficient;
ie used, is that each of the ind.pend••t ~aria~l•• are "a.ar.d in
in different unit. Therefore, it io dittioult to dater.ine the re_
lative importanc. of each ind.p.nde.t variable oa the va1•• of the
partial regression coefficient, B, al.... Siac. the relative oon_;'
tribution of .ach indapendent variable i. of tatar.at, the Standv!
ardized Re~reesioD Coefficienta. Beta. are .-ed.
Other things being equa1, tha partia1 oorralatioa coefficient
indicates that one standard deyiatio. unit of ohang. wo*1d in-
roduce a cbange in the value ot tb. d.pend••t variabl••qual to
the .alue of the B or Beta coefficiant aulti»1ie' by tha yal.a of
the purtipul r nd~pendt'nt variable.
~.-<- • "
f
The regre~eion equation tor period one le:-
H.I'.D.(H.'.~.) .. 18.26 -+ .1465 (H.PoD.CA.,,). _ .4069 H.P.V.(uuelllplo::f1llellt)
+ .4}84 H.p.v.Ce.p.I) _ .1252 (H.P.Do(M.W.lag)
I -+ .0423 H.P.V.(W.D.L.) - .0271 H.P.V.(produetiTit,.).The overell accurecy ot the prediction regresaioD equation ie
reflected by the coefficient of deter.inetioD R2, which iUdlc~t.S/
the proportion of variation explained by tb. vari.ble. in the re-
gresaion equetion. which, for period one, 1a~ per cent.
Prediction accuracy in abeolute unit. ie reflected b1 tb. standerd
error of eati.et. for tb. regr••aion equetloD, which ie tbe .t8nd~~d~
deviation ot the residuals, whioh are the value. ot the ditterenc~
between the actual and predicted values ot the independent variable.
H.P.D.(M.V). F9r period one the etandard error ot eati.ate i •• 446
which innicatee that on the .ver ~edicted H.P.D(H.W) acores
:::'ill deviate trolll the actu .~.) by .2446 units on the
M.P.D.{H.~) 5cele.
.,...------ "'===."'''''''''=''''''':::._''' -.;'''52 ;;:.;;;;_:":;:;::;:::::::=::=~.
Y_ .., --f-- ~.iu..~ ..~ ~r,p 4~
l(
/
The regre•• on predict~on equation tor period two i8 aa tollowa:_
ILP.D.{H.V.) ;; 57.62 ••6601 H.P.D.(A ..... ) + .5051 H.P.V.(productiTity)
.4122 H.P.V.(unemplo~ent)
- .2415 H.P.D.(M.~.lag) + .1315 H.P.V.{W.D.L.)
+ .0695 M.p.v.{e.p.I).
The ~ v21ue ia~ indicating that 62.51 par cent ot the
v~ri~tion in dependent v'ri~ble H.i.D.{H.W.) i. explained hy the
v~ri~bles in the re.l;ression equ",tion to~ period two. The st"nd-'rd t:n ,.
of ostim3te ror pe~iod tw Os .216~jJUHrcating that, on the "ver~ge,
predicted M.r.D.(H.W.) acores deviate troll the 8ctual H.P.D.(H.'}.)
by .21651 unite on the H••• (H. ) .cale.
For period three the regresaicn prediction equation is:_
H.P.D.(H.W.) E 15.}6 - .4}92 (H.P.D.(W.D.L.) - .4512 H.p.v.{e.p.I)
+ .6275 H.P.D.(A.V.) - .6701 M.P.V.(productivity)
_ .2316 M.P.D.(H.W.las) + .2562 M.P.Y.{unellploYllent).
The ~ TIIlue is~. indicating that 74.47 per cent ot the
variation in the de~ndent variable M.P.D.(M.W.) is explained by the
v,ri8blea in the regression equatioD tor period three. The .taud"rd
error of estilll8te for the period three regre.aioa equation i••86296.
indicating that, on the average, predicted H.P.D.(M.W.) value. will
deviate from the 8ctual H.P.D.(H.W.) valuea by .86296 units OD the
H.P.O.(H.W.) ~eale.
In overall terms. the regression equation tor period three ex_pl~ina more v~rience tor period three thaD do the other two equ.tio~
ror their respectiYe periods, but i. least aocurllte ot the thr.e j
~ equ~tions,becllu8e of the high Y81u. ot the st8ndard error ot estimate.
lhe re~re&~ion equ3tioD for period two is the .ost uneful of the
three equ,tione, becanee it expl'ins a relativel~ high 62 per cent
of the varioDce in dependent variable K.P.D.(H.W.) 8nd ha. 8 rel~tively
hiuh levol of 8ccurllCY. liS indicatad by the standard error ot estia~te
or .2446, but it only ex~l.ina 22.18 per cent ot tbe y~ri.nc.
in H.Jl.D.(H.Ir:.).
CONCLUSI01'l'S.
The h~potheses which baye bee. postulated, tbe obaerYatio..
which h••e been made in order to test tbe.e bypot~e&ee ..d tbe
conclusions concerning the retDtatioa aad coatiraatioa ot tbese,
hypotheaes. are auamed up ia tbe tollovias table:-
H~pothesi&
Or,at\.izatioaalHa n'tltDance .1.
Econolldc
H~potbesie E2
Econoeic
Hypotbeds E'
Organizational
Maintenance
Hypothesis OM2
Period 1
Refuted
Refuted
Confireed
Refuted
Period. 2
Refut.d
Refuted
Coa.erae
'U§fUl..
Sliglltly
coafil'1led
Coafiraed
Refuhd.
Period. ,
SpuriolW
Refuted
Refuted
Refuted
Refuted.
OYerall
Retuted
Refuted
Refuted,
except for
Period 2.
Refuted
The o.erall i.pressioa saiaed tro. exaaiB4tioa of the eoaclusioDa
deriyed froa testiag tbe hypothesea ia,that vith the exception of
Beonomic Hypothesia E3. oa the baais of the P.arsoa ..d Partial cor_
relatiOD coefficients, they have beea refut.d. Beoaoaic Hypotheaie
B3 ia rep'arded aa confir.ed. ia that two out of the tllree period.
etudied iadicate that, with the exceptioa of th. vas. iadexatio.
period, the Full S.nch tended to abataia tro. awardiag .. abo.e ia_
flatioa .i.iaUD wag. i.creas. ia t~e e••at of • aarg~ percentage
incr.a.. ia u•••ployaeDt. !h. fact of riaiag ...aplor-eat aad bish
iatl.tioa during tll. wage iad.xatioa period aceouate for th. refu
atioa of bypotheai. 83. ia that tb. iad.xatio. guid.liae. read.re
ehaagee ia the Co.enaer Price Iadex .& t~ ..jor.faotor. Dotvlt~_
.t.adias the rieia. tueber of uae.ployod paraO". !ke a ••d of thO/
unioa. to seek to .aiat.i. th. li.ias _taadard. of tkeir a.ab.re va
apparentlr so great that ther were vill~S to p.t a a..ber of jO~
at riak, ia ord.r to achiey. thia aad ao at tll. qaarter1y KatioaaI
Vaga Ca•• beariagft th.y presaed for full wage iaoreas•• ia lia. vith
C.P.I iaerea••s.
1 '
Organizational Maiatenance HTPotbeaia O.H.l ~a. b••• fouad
refuted, due to the lov aagnitudea of tbe Peareo. -ad partia1
correlation coefficient., which vera belov.lOOO in ..guttud_,
indicatiag that no diacernibl_ ralatioaahip esiated betw••• the
status of the give. minimua vage award in regard to intlatio.
and tb. atatue of the pr.Tlo~ aiatau. wage increaaa. !bia va.
the ca.. for both periods 0••••d two. The P••rao. oorral.tio.
tor period thre., which repre••nta tb••age iadexatioa period i.
isolatie., indicated tkat thera ~ be • alight rel_tto.-hip bet-
vee•• give. a.d a previoua aiatau. .aga i.cr..... BoW.Ter,
coatrollieg for i.cre.eea i. iaflatioRt a. i.dietted br MPV(CPI),
indicated a stronger relatio••bip, but it va. argued that i.-
flatioR is a~ i.terTe~i.g Tariabl•••tao... iaereaee is KPD(KWlag)
co~tributee. i. tbe period of quarterly wage tadezatioa beariRse.
to tbe _811itude of KPV(CPI), which b tbe b_b of the J"u1l Bench
decisioa as to the magaitude of tbe _ext aiaiau. wage i.crease.
Therefore, it is unwise to regard the oorrelatioa coefrioieat ob_
tained by controlling for MPV(CPI) a. .. iadicatioa of relatio._
ship, but it does poiat out the high17 probable extent to whicb
the relation.hip betv.ea HPD(MWlag) aad independent Tariable HPD(KW)
depende on iaflatioll. rather than allJ' deaire by the Full Bench to ./
alternatiTely present aboTe end belov iaflatioa aiaisua wage awarda.
Nor does it seell, o~ the eTidence conaidered, that the Full
Bench regards miniaua vage evards a8 a policy iaetruaeat for reduc-
ing industrial unrest. In periods oae a.d two, whicb i.clude aDd
exclude the vage indicatioD period respecti.e17, there 1s no iDdic-
ation that. as far aa the miniaua vage award ia cOllcerDed, the Full
Bench adopts any identlfi8ble attitude towards TariatioD. i. the
nu.ber of worki~~ days loat, aiace tbe PeArSO. oorrelatiOR ooefficient
18 leS8 than ~OOO. In period three, ia vhieh the vage indexatioa
case. are isolated. the Pearaon correlatioR indioate. that large ilr.- I
crease. in industrial unrest te.da to coi.oide vith below inflatio.
miniaus vage awarda. which retuted ~otheaia 1.R.I. Howe.er, since
controlling for HPV(productiTity) a&d KPD(AV) together render the
hypothesized relatio••hip spurio_, eb.erTatio•• based oa tke Pear_
soa correlatio& coefficient ahould be Tiewed witk c.utioa for period
three. !'he probable rea.o. tor tll. Roa _. of tbe atat.-ua wage a.
an iaetruae.t of ainiRi.tag iaduatrial aareat,ia. that .trike.
usually concera wagee and co.dit10.. of e&p10TRe.t ia apecific ia-
dustried and for specific occupatioR groupe, oo.eti~e. based OR
issues such as o.er award par.eata, okill differeatiatioD, de"rcatioa
disputes and dismis.a18, and occa.io.a11T political atrikeo occur,
such as the nationwide general atrike oyer the Hedibaak iasue i. late
1975. Since strikes are not directed at tbe ainiRua Bage itselt, it
is plausible that the miaimua vage Tari.tio.. in themael.ea, are DOt
used as an instrument t~ control strike.. If th. unio.. conaider a
minimua wage increase inadequate, theT tend to oaapai~ tor wage
--_..-.S••••IIii ' ' nii••••_ i1ilii.&liiii.·iii;;·.·1i*iii·.·;;::;;;;;· III '\..'.·.!.!.·.t5.',·,,"o;:.,,~.·
(
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,
iacreases uader individual industrJ awards, which the Co~i••l0.
handles seperately. with each c1al. jadsed oa it. iadiTidual
l'Ierit8~
Economic Hypothesis El, whicb h~poth.aize. that, .... ia-
flatiOD control moaaura. the Full Benoh will award. below ia-
flatio. minil'lua wage award it there i •• .argin&l i_cr.ase 1~
inf]atioa.la refuted and the conTer•• t ••lightl~ oODtiraed for
all periods, when waSe iadexatioa Is iacluded, excluded aad
isolated, on the b••ia of the P••rsoa oorretatioa oostricl••te,
although for period thr•• t the beta ooefficient ..... to co_lira
the hypothesis. The probable reaeoa for the tact that there i ••
alight tendency for the~e.Ch to gr..t above iaflatioa .iai-
mum wage increases, i~~that it feele that it i. morall1 obligated
to pursue a policy inYolving wage ju.tioe, preaerTatioa of it.
control over wage fixatioa and, po.sibly .iai.isatio. of vage re_
lated industrial disputes. to deay vage i.ore•••• aeceaaary for wages
to keep pace with inflatioa, vould me.. uaioae ••ekiag wage i._
creases outside the Arbitratioe sy.te., by direct aegotiatio. backed
up by atrike action. Thus, slthough miai... wage. ~ aot be i.
direct reaponae to previoue iaduetrial uareet, aboTe iaflatioa .ini_
mum wage awards may possibly be granted as a palliatiTe to poasible
future industrial actioe.
Productivity has, at tiaea. been aentioned by the Full Bench
a8 a basis for deciaioa making regardiag proapective miniaue vageV increases. On th a.is of the defi.! tio. of the productiv! ty of
f1L.._-;'" labour CO~d here, it ....ould appear that this is not always
~- necessarily the case, aa ca. be ooncluded fro••aalysl. of periOd
~~one Pearaon and partial correlatic•• , the low aasnitud•• of which
-q~ are evidence of the inviaibility or noa exi.tence of ~ aubstaa-
tial relationship between the productiTity of labour aad the etatus
of the mini.u. wage in relation to iaflatioa. Eliaiaatiag the cases
heard under the wage indexatioa guideliaes, causea a slight coa_
fir~atioa of the positive relatioaship betveea productivity ia-
creasea and Mini... wage iacreaaea to becoae evideat. However, t~
may be a statietiCal effect due to the reductioa i. the auaber of
caaea. For period three, coaaideriag the vage iadexatioa cases ia
isolation, the hypothe.i. ia refutad .ad tha coaverse18e.e to be
true, vhich ia that decreasea ia t~e productivity of labour coincide
with above iatlatiOD vege increaaea. this i. probably due to the
dimiaishing margi.al rate of retura of labour dari.s 1975 ead 1976,
caused by the iacreaaea ia miaia.. aad other vagaa and aatiquated
equipment. The probable reaa08 for the apParent lack ot coacera
for the whole period 1956 - 1976,ia, that productivity iDcreaa.8l
at a faster rete than inflatioa _ ~ence vagea and the replacement
coat of capital equipment alao iacrea.ed at a lover rate thea
productivity. Thus, productivity wa. for aoat of the period 1956-
1976 not a major eonsideratioD and, ther.fore, there wa. little. it
any, response by the Full Bench to Tariatioa. iD productiTity, thus
refuting hypothesis EZ.
!:CltJler do ooocrvotions or the: relationship bet\oleen per-
cent,j,;e incrCO:JOil in the D.?Cr~ wage and ~lm(J.il} preseltt
CVide!ICC ot an oreaniz,j,tional maintenance r;otivaUon on the part
of the members of the Full Bench. lVPothes1aOl42 postulates an in'99rse
relationship betwen MFU(AW} am. MFtl(KI), but. the IDlarityof the
correlation oocffioients im,leate that the relationship 18 a direct
one. Harcinal percentage increases in the average vage tend to
precede above-inflation m1ni.mum vage avard., rather than blllov-
inflation min1lllum wase increases, \lMn inoll.lding aIJl excluding
the wage iroexation deta, \/bieh, vben bolated and examined separately,
indicate the absence of a oeanillg1'ul relatioIl5hip between Yar1etions
in the avera, \l8e& end varietioIl5 in the mini•• wage. Thus it ean
be oonclooed that the reltltionship blltveen KPD(Mi} em MFD(JJI) does
not deoonstrate or3anizational eaintenan08 ~tiTation on the part of
the Full Deneh. /
>-..
On the basis of the foregoing stati~ticel ana11sis. it can
be concluded that for the periods fro~ 1956 - 1976, including
and e~cluding the vage inde~3tion period, that there is a tend-
ency for the Full Bench to award belov inflation minimum Y3~e
increases if there 1s a Darg1nal percentage increase in unemploy-
ment. or if there is a carginal decrease in une~ploy~ent, the
Full Bench may tend to ayard above-inflation mini.um wage in-
creaees. thue confirming hypothesis E3. In period three, Yhere
the wage indexation cases are isolated, it appears that the Full
Bench awards above-inflation ~inimum wage increases, despite
•
=arginel psrcentage increaoes in uDemplo1~ent. This could he
due to the tact that.in 1975 and 1976, iDflation was rising
with such speed that the uniODS were prepared to risk employ~eDt
to the extent of maintaining their real w8Ge and, therefore,
they pressed the Full Bench to award at least a minimum wage in-
crease of the same magnitude of the preceding inflation iDcrease.
Thus, in the long term perspective of basic and mini~um wage in-
creases over twenty years, it see~s that the Full Bench ~ay have
given 80me attention to variations in unemployment. but in 1975 -
1976, when there were rapid increases in inflatiOn. maintenance
of real wages became the moin priority for the Full Bench.
J
•AltiJou,::h /IlO:;t at tha hypotheoes tested he,ve been refuted,
t<llll <lOC3 not O:::.n th"t the rc:::carch deseribed has bee::l 8. failure.
The 3b 0: this t.I~::;is hn:; lJocn to determine vhether tiE Fu'l Bonell
col1$istcntl,y ;:.lhllroU to (!iven criteria wen deciding the nagnitwe
of the ';1'1On !'Ii.nir.ll1t:I IoIS~ incrO.:l:Je, and hence its relntionship to
the rmen1tU(le of the perccntoge increase. \lhich has !Il"ofound sod.:!.!
am !-' Utical 1f'I__lic~ti{)ns. The hypotheses, as instruments, rather
than as objects of research, have provided the f'rlllWwork for the
analysis of relationships, from ..,hich the f'ollO'oling conclusions have
been dcrivod:-
11) The Full Bench of the Com.'1lOnwea!th Conciliation and .1rbitration
Comr.dssion h::3 not consistently alternated above sn::l. below inflation
minimtun wage increases.
b) The Full Bench bas not, throughout the period 1956-1976, con-
sistently awnrdod belov-inflation l'!1n1.rItuI vage increases folloving
above-inflation llvera,39 "&Jc increases. or abow-inflatu>n "in11!11l111 J
\la~e incre.:l~es foll01ol1nc belov-inf1ation average vage increases.
c} rherc ::.1:; ;:leOn a sli:.:ht ten 'oncy for the Full Benc!l to avard
aoove-inflatu>n I:dn.i.a.un \lace increases tollov1n6; on from marginal t/
!lCrcont3.,3e lne.-e.:l:leo in inf13tion.
,/
in ~1()rl'in0 day:J l03~, throu:.;h inlustrial action.
f) There )~S ben a tcrrlenc;r. in the years 1956-1976. for the Full
Bench to llwar<l above inflation min1mlJl!l wage increases following a
Jccrcllse in U.'1eJ1:1lo)-liIent am to award below inflation cdnimlDv~
incre~ses fo11ov1~ an incresse in unemployment.
g) It has been deter'Dined t.hat 26.6 per cent ot the m:1n.1mum: vage svards
ve:-e belov intlation when the Liberal Party vas in government and 20 pel:'
cent vere below in!1ation when t~e iustrallan Labour Party vas in govern-
ment. However. it should be noted that sixteen cases were beard whilst
the Liberal Party \l3S in government 8D1 tift cases vere heard \/hilst the
AustraliAn Labour Party 'oI8.S in govel'DllElllt..
d) Over tLc period 1956-1976. the Full Bench has not consistently
" ~. cd noo·/C-in.fbtion tlini.=I\~ V~'"fJ increases in res:X>ll3e to carginal
~.rCCl\t1JC inc'c':::c::: in .roductivity. or below inf1e.tion .,,1ni OUM wace /
i.hC",'::;':;C~ ir .o:::.o,~_c to t"-lr:::L'"le1 perccntsee decreases in productiVity.
e) Over the .XlrioJ !.956-!.976. the Full Bench has not consistently-
:>\1.:1r"'oc. cbove im'.ntion l,liniD.u,m wnr;o increases inrc3!'Oose to increa:lcs
/
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